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"Piracy" in the Twentieth Century 
"Piracy" by Analogy 
R ebels and War Criminals. It was observed above1 that Dr. Stephen Lushington interpreted the British Bounty Acts of 1825 and 1850 to 
incorporate into British legislation an intention of the Parliament to label any 
acts of robbery or murder upon the high seas, as "piratical acts" for the 
purposes of the bounty and further applied the 1850 act to "murder" not on 
the high seas but in the territory of Chile. It has been seen at some length that 
this particularly British confusion between "piracy" as a vague pejorative 
and a "piracy" as a technical word applicable to criminal offenses within the historical 
jurisdiction of British Admiralty tribunals, underlay many political decisions. 
The word was applied to acts outside of any British jurisdiction under the 
normal distribution oflegal powers in the international legal order; it came to 
be used routinely by British policy-makers and naval officers with regard to 
nearly any acts of foreigners against whom some forcible political action was 
directed. Although the implied reference to criminal law seemed to confuse 
only the British users of the word "piracy," who frequently found themselves 
in the political difficulties their use of a word drawn from the criminal law 
had been intended to avoid, the word appears to have re-entered the 
vocabulary of international lawyers by the end of the nineteenth century with 
meanings varying from the technical one relating to the criminal law applied 
in Admiralty tribunals to the most vague and general. It is not the object of 
this study to re-examine the definitions of "piracy" proposed, or simply 
asserted, by learned publicists in order to criticize their knowledge of history 
or their legal scholarship, but the reader must be warned that the word was 
used increasingly towards the end of the nineteenth century in ways totally 
unsupported by scholarly analysis. Lushington's usage gradually became the 
common usage of statesmen and publicists, while in fact never applied in any 
known cases when the issue of definition as a matter ofinternationallaw was 
squarely presented. Indeed, even the usage of statesmen in contexts in which a 
negotiation among European states was involved was evasive and not the 
usage approved so offhandedly by Lushington and the less contemplative men 
of action. 
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The use of the word "piracy" with regard to foreign officials remained as it 
existed in the nearly nineteenth century and supported by the Magellan Pirates 
decision's dicta, a pejorative applied to non-European and unrecognized rebel 
military forces to which the statesmen wished to attach a sense of illegality 
under international law. The Barbary states came to be routinely considered 
"piratical" in late nineteenth century writings without analysis of the actual 
treatment given their governments by European statesmen or the legal 
writings of scholars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries distinguishing 
between the common pejorative usage and the position in the international 
legal order actually accorded in practice to the governments, title 
adjudications, privateering licenses and other official acts performed by the 
constitutional authorities of those "states" affecting foreign interests. The 
failures in practice to encourage non-European societies to conform their 
behavior to the needs of European commerce by calling their military arms, 
or even their governments, "piratical," appears not to have been noticed by 
statesmen, who persisted in using the word "piracy" and its derivatives to 
refer generally to illegality under international law , but in the ultimate 
moment in every known case either to withdraw from that usage, withhold 
the legal results that they had argued should flow from it, or to apply the law 
of war to the conflicts that ensued.2 
At the same time, the use of the word "piratical" to describe acts that would 
be "war crimes" were it conceded that the law of war applied, seemed to 
increase. Ironically, the first known usage clearly in that context was in the 
Lieber Code, General Orders No. 100 of the United States Federal Army 
promulgated by President Lincoln on 24 April 1863.3 The irony exists in the fact 
that the Lieber Code itself was regarded from the very first as a codification of 
the international law of war, although issued in a conflict in which the Federal 
Government of the United States did not consider the Confederate forces to be 
entitled to the status implied by the application of that body of law.4 The 
distinction drawn between enemy soldiers who fit the form of classical 
soldierdom and enemy irregulars, those who commit acts that would be within a 
soldier's privilege but "without any commission, without being part and 
portion of the organized army, and without sharing continuously in the war," 
seems strange in a code issued at a time the Federal authorities insisted that all 
Confederate soldiers had no privileges by right but were treated as if they had 
such privileges only as a matter of political concession by the Federal 
Government. But, assuming that the Federal Government had by implication 
accepted the law appropriate to true "belligerency" by 1863 as the legal regime 
best suited to the facts even without expressly saying so, it is interesting to note 
the reference to "pirates:" 
Men, or squads of men, who commit hostilities, whether by fighting ... or by raids of 
any kind, without commission, without being part and portion of the organized army, 
and without sharing continuously in the war, but who do so with intermittent return to 
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their homes and avocations, or with the occasional assumption of the semblance of 
peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character or appearance of soldiers-such 
men, or squads of men, are not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not 
entitled to the privileges of prisoners of war, but shall be treated summarily as highway 
robbers or pirates.5 
It is noteworthy that these "unprivileged belligerents" were not considered to 
be "highwaymen or pirates," but only to be treated as if they were; their status 
was determined by analogy and the legal label was not given them directly. 
It is tempting to see in this innovative usage a compromise between the 
excessive language of polemicists and the scholarship of Francis Lieber and his 
learned panel of revisers.6 
The analogy is dropped without explanation in the succeeding partial 
codifications of the laws of war and there is no mention of "pirates" in the 
Brussels Rules of 1874, the Oxford Manual of 1880 or the great Hague 
Conventions of1899 and 1907.7 Instead, those who act beyond the privileges 
of soldiers may legally be treated as war criminals under the laws of war as 
administered by the courts of the capturing power, and those who are 
determined not to have the privileges of soldiers at all are subject to the 
"normal" criminal laws of the state into whose hands they have fallen; the 
charges against them would not be "piracy" or "highway robbery" unless 
those laws so provided as a matter of municipal law, and no implication of 
international purview over the definition of their offenses would exist. 
The word "piracy" pops up again in connection with the laws of war as a 
semi-learned response to the excesses felt by the British to flow from the 
invention of the submarine as a commerce-destroying weapon applied during 
the First World war. At the Washington Conference of 1922 on the 
Limitation of Armaments, the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy and 
Japan agreed that the general international law of war forbade the 
destruction of a merchant ship "unless the crew and passengers have been first 
placed in safety," and specifically affirmed that this rule applied to 
belligerent submarines.8 Going further, the signatories declared that: 
[A ]ny person in the service of any Power who shall violate any of those rules, whether or 
not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have 
violated the laws of war and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of 
piracy and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any Power 
within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.9 
This language seems extremely confusing. "Piracy" is not a "war crime" 
historically or by any known definition applied in diplomatic practice or 
court case. Indeed, the term "piracy" was historically used to distinguish 
those who fought as privateers under the laws of war and those who had no 
valid commissions or sailed under the commissions of unrecognized powers 
and thus were subject not at all to the laws of war but to the normal criminal 
law of some state with the necessary legal interest to try them.10 
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It has been noted that the form of commission lost importance over time, 
and the essential question in the universal "natural" municipal laws of 
"piracy" became whether the accused "pirate" had an intention to rob for his 
own ends (animo furandi), failing which he was not a "pirate" regardless of 
defects in his commission.ll It has also been noted that as a matter of public 
international law, attempts to draw the legal results of municipal law 
"piracy" with the added twist of universal jurisdiction failed both as to the 
expansion of jurisdiction beyond the case of stateless "pirates" and as to the 
extension of any protective jurisdiction on the high seas beyond ships of the 
flag and individuals who are nationals of the state seeking to exercise that 
jurisdiction.12 Now, under the 1922 formula, the major victorious allies of the 
First W orId War seem to have tried by treaty among themselves alone to 
forbid states even to issue commissions or order the use of submarines against 
merchant ships, and to make those acting under the authority of those invalid 
commissions or illegal orders not only "war criminals," who would be 
subject to punishment only by a state with the requisite "standing" to apply 
the law of war to the individual concerned, but in other ways analogous to a 
"pirate." This presumed that as a matter of international law "piracy" and 
"war criminality" were somehow similar, which is not evident, and that one 
legal result of attaching the label "pirate" by analogy ("as if for an act of 
piracy") was universal jurisdiction in states with no legal interest in the 
matter beyond finding the accused within their territory.13 The language of 
the 1922 Conference has been variously construed, but in fact has never been 
applied to a submariner.14 In the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of 
Naval Armaments signed at London on 22 April 1930, Part IV, article 22 
repeats the substance of article 1 of the 1922 Conference's Final Act, but does 
not repeat the analogy to "piracy. "15 Nor does that analogy reappear in the 
Proces-Verbal of 6 November 1936 which continued the terms of the 1930 
Treaty and vastly expanded the number of states parties to that statement of 
substantive law.16 
The analogy of submarine warfare against merchant ships to "piracy" was 
revived to some extent by the Nyon Agreement of 1937. That Agreement 
among nine "Mediterranean" states, including Bulgaria, Rumania and the 
USSR, but excluding the United States, Germany and Italy, repeats the 
"piracy" analogy in its Preamble: 
\Vhereas arising out of the Spanish conflict attacks have been repeatedly committed in 
the Mediterranean by submarines against merchant ships not belonging to either of the 
conflicting Spanish parties; and 
Whereas these attacks are violations of the rules of intemationallaw referred to in Part 
IV of the Treaty of London of22 April 1930 ... and constitute acts contrary to the most 
elementary dictates of humanity, which should be justly treated as acts of piracy; and 
Whereas •.. it is necessary in the first place to agree upon certain special collective 
measures against piratical acts by submarines .. .17 
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But in the operative text, there is no mention of "piracy" or "piratical acts." 
Submarines believed to have attacked neutral merchant vessels in disregard of 
the 1930 and 1936 Rules, it is provided, "shall be counter-attacked and, if 
possible, destroyed," but there is no provision for criminal trials of their 
officers or crew. Nor is there any assertion of universal jurisdiction, although 
special rights of operation are asserted by the British and French fleets on the 
high seas within the Mediterranean, and access to the Mediterranean ports of 
other states parties to the Agreement is provided. Whether those special 
rights went beyond the bounds of British and French rights under general 
international law seems doubtful, and, of course, the access provisions are a 
matter of agreement only. On the other hand, the assumption of a legal 
authority to clear the seas of commerce-destroying submarines that had not 
attacked the merchant ships of Great Britain or France or any of the other 
parties to the Nyon Agreement does seem to have assumed some special 
jurisdiction in Great Britain and France outside the scope of the Agreement 
itself. Unless Great Britain and France were willing to concede the same 
military jurisdiction to a non-party, like Italy, however, the jurisdiction 
would not seem properly to be considered an extension of "universal" 
jurisdiction to "piratical" submarines, but a continued British assertion, now 
shared with France, of a special authority to safeguard international 
commerce based on the special interest, military strength and moral 
assertiveness of the British alone.18 There is no known evidence of the British 
and French attitude towards Italian or other non-party assertions of the 
jurisdiction asserted by the British and French, but it may be noteworthy that 
the Nyon Agreement itself does not mention "universal jurisdiction" or give 
any legal basis for the British and French activities outside of the operative 
terms of the document. If an analogy is sought to prior state practice in the 
face of asserted belligerent rights against neutral merchant shipping, under 
which the affected neutrals banded together to police the seas, the closest 
historically might be the so-called "armed neutralities" of 1780 and 1800.19 
Without excessive research in England it is impossible to discover the 
origin of the references to "piracy" and "piratical acts" in the Preamble to 
the Nyon Agreement, but the clauses in which they appear both look like late 
additions to the text and seem to reflect British positions trying to turn the 
political use of the word "piracy" into some legal rule. Since the words do not 
appear in the operative text, and the legal conception that might underlie 
them seems unnecessary to explain the conceptions that support the 
Agreement itself, the point seems not worth further discussion. It might be 
significant that three days after the conclusion of the Nyon Agreement, a 
Supplementary Agreement was concluded at Geneva by the same nine 
powers which again in the Preamble refers to "piratical acts by submarines in 
the Mediterranean," but extends the terms of the Nyon Agreements, 
including its special policing authority for the British and French, to "similar 
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attacks" on neutral merchant ships in the Mediterranean by surface ships or 
aircraft.20 No legal basis or legal result seems to exist to give meaning in law 
to the phrase "piratical acts" in this context. It looks more like the attempts 
seen in the United States and Great Britain throughout the nineteenth century 
to somehow involve "war criminals," or unrecognized belligerents not 
acting animo furandi while interfering with peaceful commerce, in a legal 
category of common crime, with the enforcement left to British or American 
ships as a matter of immediate political and military action, to the exclusion 
of the courts. As such, rather than reflecting universal jurisdiction to apply 
municipal criminal law, it seems to reflect a conception of special military or 
political rights to impose order on the high seas in the interests of general 
commerce and to confine rebellion to national borders of a single state, to the 
profit of third country merchants. It seems clear from the silence of the 
operative texts concluded at Nyon that not all of the countries represented 
there agreed that the word "piratical" had any place in the legal rationale for 
their concurrences. 
In the Western Hemisphere, there is direct evidence that states rejected 
the concept of "piracy" as appropriate to acts that did not involve the 
animum furandi without in any way limiting the legal power of a state to call 
its rebels "pirates" for the purposes of its own municipal law , as England 
had done in the 1690s and for some purposes under the Act of1700,21 and the 
Federal Government of the United States had done in 1861-1864,22 and as 
Peru had not done in 1877.23 On 20 February 1928, 20 states of Latin America 
plus the United States signed24 the Havana Convention on Civil Strife.25 
Ratifications include 13 between 1929 and 1937, 2in 1945, 2 in 1950 and 1 in 
1957. Article 2 of that Convention says: "The declaration of piracy against 
vessels which have risen in arms, emanating from a Government, is not 
binding upon the other States." On the one hand, this could be regarded as a 
mere statement of the self-evident positivist position that each state has an 
equal power with all other states to classify events in legal terms as suits 
each classifying state's policy and perceptions; it does not prevent any state 
from labeling rebel ships as "piratical." On the other hand, article 2 of the 
Convention continues: 
The State that may be injured by depredations originating from insurgent vessels is 
entitled to adopt the following punitive measures against them: Should the authors of 
the damages be warships, it may capture and return them to the Government of the State 
to which they belong, for their trial; should the damage originate with merchantmen, 
the injured State may capture and subject them to the appropriate penal laws. 
The insurgent vessel ... which flies the flag of a foreign country ... may also be captured 
and tried by the State of said flag.26 
This specification of the state receiving the injury and the state whose flag is 
flown as the states to apply their criminal laws to the insurgents strongly 
implies that third states have no business in the affair; that universal 
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jurisdiction does not exist and that the law to be applied is the municipal law 
of the capturing state. 
This impression is confirmed by article 3 of the Convention, which 
provides that an insurgent vessel arriving in a foreign country (presumably 
any country not suffering depredations and not the flag state of the vessel) 
shall return the vessel and consider the crew" as political refugees. "Zl There is 
no hint of criminality. 
Aircraft Hijacking. Aside from polemical writings, there appears to be only 
one other situation in the twentieth century in which "piracy" has been 
spoken of seriously as a living legal conception applicable in circumstances 
1 h d b " 1 . 1""· " Th h ana ogous to w at was presume to e c aSSlca pnacy. at was t e 
situation of aerial hijacking. 
The notion that aircraft could be seized by people of unknown nationality 
or no nationality, or subordinate to no recognized licensing authority, and 
that such seized aircraft could interfere with air navigation over the high seas, 
Antarctica or other parts of the globe outside the territorial jurisdiction of 
any particular state, makes it possible to consider that the reasons supporting 
an international law of "piracy" might apply as well to aircraft as to ships. In 
the attempts to codify the supposed public international law of "piracy" 
culminating in articles 14-22 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas28 aircraft came to be included with ships as if equally susceptible to 
"piratical" seizure and uses. Thus, when in the 1960s several incidents arose 
involving the seizure of commercial aircraft by passengers seeking to divert 
them for their own purposes to some country other than the one which their 
operators had intended, and some commercial aircraft seizures were made 
with the apparent intention of making some political statement, or drawing 
public attention to the real or fancied grievances of some political movement 
or individual, the phrase "aircraft piracy" came into vogue in the United 
States and elsewhere.29 Nonetheless, in the legal action taken by states in the 
international plane to control this interference with international commerce, 
the word "piracy" and its presumed legal results were not used.30 Instead, in 
the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board 
Aircraft signed at Tokyo on 14 September 196331 municipal jurisdiction and 
municipal substantive law were taken as the basis for the control of 
unauthorized actions on board aircraft in flight or outside national territorial 
jurisdiction. As to jurisdiction, the state of registry of the aircraft was 
confirmed in its competence to exercise jurisdiction to enforce its municipal 
criminal law prescriptions over offenses and acts committed on board. In 
addition, "universal" jurisdiction to prescribe was impliedly rejected as 
contracting states which are not states of registry of the aircraft in which the 
reprehended act has occurred were forbidden to interfere with the aircraft in 
flight, even over their territory, thus within the enforcement jurisdiction of 
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the state, except for five situations: (a) the offense has effect on the territory 
of the interfering state; (b) the offense has been committed against a national 
or permanent resident of that state; (c) the offense is against the security of 
that state; (d) the offense consists of a breach of rules relating to the flight of 
the aircraft within that state; or (e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to 
ensure the observation of a multilateral international agreement by that 
state.32 All of these categories seem vague enough, but all seem linked to 
traditional bases for municipal criminal law prescriptive jurisdiction33 and 
require legal "standing," some special interest in the situation to warrant 
action other than the general interest of all states in the safety of international 
civil aviation. 
The most far-reaching provisions of the Tokyo Convention do not really 
go to questions of criminal jurisdiction at all, but to the authority of an 
aircraft commander to discharge a passenger on foreign territory, and the 
obligation of the state in whose territory the person is disembarked to receive 
him and detain him until the normal criminal law of some state with 
jurisdiction to prescribe has been examined and extradition, if appropriate, or 
trial in the state of disembarkation, if appropriate, has been set in motion.34 
The offenses coming within this jurisdictional arrangement are any 
offenses against the penal law of any state which, under the Convention, has 
jurisdiction to prescribe, and "acts which, whether or not they are offenses, 
mayor do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or of persons or property 
therein . . . "35 The conceptual framework thus seems not to involve any 
abstract uniform definition of "piracy" unless acts which may jeopardize the 
safety of the aircraft or of persons or property in it are classified by some 
pertinent state's municipal law with that label. But since those acts might 
well include acts which are not criminal under any known conception of 
criminal law , such as the uncontrollable fit of a person incompetent to control 
his actions, or simply obstreperous drunkenness, it is very difficult to see in 
this language an attempt to define "piracy." The reference to offenses against 
the penal law of any state having jurisdiction under the Convention to 
prescribe offenses seems reminiscent of the most expansive position taken by 
Justice Story in the United States in 181236 and rejected by the Supreme Court 
including Story himself.37 
It would appear that the Tokyo Convention viewed this way is not 
addressed to any questions of substantive criminal law , but to questions of the 
safety of civil aviation. It resolves those questions by encouraging states to 
exercise their existing prescriptive jurisdictions based on linkages between 
the place of the act, the nationality of the actors and their victims, and the 
impact of the act on the territory of the state involved, but does not assert any 
"universal jurisdiction" that could involve states which are strangers to the 
incident in the enforcement processes of the law. It does not define any 
criminal acts at all, but encourages states to use their existing penal codes in 
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cases within their jurisdiction, and, in its one innovation, requires states to 
receive obstreperous passengers or crew members whose acts might endanger 
flight safety; but not for the purpose of criminal proceedings (unless 
otherwise based). The obstreperous passenger, if not otherwise to be tried or 
extradited for trial on the basis of existing national penal laws and extradition 
treaties, is to be released promptly.38 
A far more innovative approach was taken in the Hague Convention of16 
December 1970 for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.39 That 
Convention does not use the word "piracy," but instead defines in general 
terms "the offense": 
Any person who on board an aircraft in flight: 
(a) unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or by any other form of intimidation, 
seizes, or exercises control of, that aircraft, or attempts to perform any such act, or 
(b) is an accomplice of a person who performs or attempts to perform any such act, 
(c) commits an offense (hereinafter referred to as "the offense").40 
Each contracting party is bound to make "the offense" punishable "by severe 
penalties. "41 The United States has done so by directly referring to the 
Convention in a statute making the commission of '''an offense,' as defined in 
the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft" 
punishable by "not less than 20 years" imprisonment.42 Oddly, the American 
statute goes on to repeat verbatim the definition of the offense as set out 
above.43 Presumably the intention was merely to set out in American 
municipal law what the elements of the offense were to be, and the 
incorporation by reference to the Convention was to assure that the 
definition would be regarded as the discharge of American obligations under 
Article 2 of the Convention and to assure that the definition of the offense 
would be interpreted in the light of the international negotiation, not merely 
the American interpretation of it.44 
In fact, the interpretation of the Convention's definitional article is not 
free from doubt. What, for example, does the word "unlawfully" refer to? If 
"unlawful" under the law of the flag state alone, the definition would seem to 
require states to cooperate in the suppression of revolution, where the rebels 
seize the aircraft as an act of what they regard as lawful war not subject to the 
flag state's municipallaw, and the defending government regards as an act of 
municipal law robbery or treason. Indeed, rebellion is not the only situation in 
which the question would arise; any enemy seizure in the claimed exercise of 
belligerent rights would be "unlawful" under the law of the state whose 
aircraft is seized. yet it is most unlikely that the parties to the Convention 
were attempting to insulate civil aviation entirely from the vicissitudes of 
military action. 
If, on the other hand, "unlawful" is intended to refer to "international 
law," then belligerents might have the authority to seize enemy flag civil 
aircraft (or even neutral flag civil aircraft in some circumstances, for 
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example, to prevent the flow of contraband to blockaded territory). But 
then the legitimacy of the seizure would seem to depend on whether the 
state interpreting the Convention in any particular case "recognized" the 
belligerent status of the organization authorizing the ·seizure .. It seems 
unlikely that much additional security to international civil aviation would 
result as long as the group doing the seizing had influential political 
sympathizers in a potential state oflanding. Moreover, questions such as the 
validity and extent of the "authorization" would become significant, and 
the same issues would arise that resulted in the eventual abandonment of the 
"lack of license" condition as an element of the classical British (and 
possibly international) law of "piracy. "45 These doubts are in large part 
resolved as a result of dropping the animo furandi qualification of British 
municipal law as it had been applied in British assertions of international 
law, and then abandoned as the world "piracy" came increasingly to be 
used as a mere excuse for political action unjustifiable under any concept of 
legal tradition limiting the policing jurisdiction of states with no direct 
legal interest in a particular incident.46 The legal effect of dropping" animo 
furandi" as an essential element of the "international crime" of civil aircraft 
hijacking is apparently to inject the international community into political 
matters that might have been confined to a single state or small group of 
states. 
That is the Convention's great innovation. Civil aviation by widely 
accepted treaty seems now to be, at least among the parties to the Convention 
not uttering reservations dealing with political motivation,47 legally 
protected from interference on the basis of substantive la~ analogous to the 
legal rules asserted to underlie the protection maritime states claimed was 
owed to merchant shipping on the high seas in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Civil aviation is, as it were, "neutral" with regard to political 
struggles among recognized belligerents and its liability to seizure determined 
by the laws and customs of war in that context. In the absence of 
"belligerency," the "lawfulness" of the seizure by a group whose status in the 
international legal order is "unrecognized" by another state is, as far as that 
other state is concerned, non-existent for lack of an authority competent to 
issue a license either under any municipal law or under international law. In 
neither case is motive or intention, animus furandi, pertinent to triggering the 
legal obligations of the states parties to the Convention. 
The jurisdictional provisions, article 4, of the Convention approach 
"universality" in a way that only Justice Joseph Story and other extreme 
"naturalists" would have found congenial: 
1. Each Contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offense or any other act of violence against passengers or crew 
committed by the alleged offender in connection with the offense, in the following 
cases: 
(a) when the offense is committed on board an aircraft registered in that State; 
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(b) when the aircraft on board which the offense is committed lands in its territory 
with the alleged offender still on board; 
(c) when the offense is committed on board an aircraft leased without crew to a lessee 
who has his principal place of business ... in that State. 
2. Each Contracting State shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offense in the case where the alleged offender is present 
in its territory and it does not extradite him pursuant to Article 8 to any of the States 
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this Article ... 48 
Article 8, in pertinent part, says: 
1. The offense shall be deemed to be included as an extraditable offense in any 
extradition treaty existing between Contracting States ... 
But the full impact of Article 4.2 cannot be understood unless read 
inconjunction with yet another provision of the Convention, article 7: 
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it 
does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not 
the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities 
for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall take their decision in the same 
manner as in the case of any ordinary offense of a serious nature under the law of the 
State.49 
The intention seems clear to make the state in which the offender is found 
legally competent to try him even in the absence of other contacts between 
the offender or the offense and that state. This is the jurisdiction asserted 
historically in the case of piracy only by "naturalist" jurists, and applied as far 
as can be told from the present research, only very few times.50 
Since the "universal" jurisdiction provided in the case of aerial hijacking is 
provided by treaty, and is not necessarily a reflection of any underlying 
conviction of law, the precise legal situation is less clear than might at first 
appear. If, for example, the "asylum" state refuses to extradite the accused, 
perhaps for lack of an extradition treaty which article 8 can be considered to 
amend, there is no obligation in article 7 to try him in the exercise of 
"universal" jurisdiction, but only to submit the case to the "asylum" state's 
competent authorities for prosecution. They can still find prosecution 
undesirable or impossible for lack of evidence or even for lack of jurisdiction 
dver the offense regardless of article 4.2. For example, in the American 
legislation to implement the Convention in the United States, it is provided: 
The subsection shall only be applicable if the place of takeoff or the place of actual 
landing of the aircraft on board which the offense, as defmed ... [above], is committed is 
situated outside the territory of the State of registration of that aircraft.51 
Taken together with other provisions that define the "special aircraft 
jurisdiction of the United States, "52 this seems to mean that if a civil aircraft 
registered outside the United States, and flying between one third state and 
another, not actually landing in the United States, and not leased to a lessee 
with a principal place of business or permanent residence in the United States, 
is hijacked, the United States will still lack a court competent to try the 
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accused for his offense. It is not known how the United States can argue 
persuasively that this restrictive view of American jurisdiction in the case of 
aircraft hijacking discharges American obligations under article 4.2 of the 
Convention, but if the American legislation is consistent and complete and 
does discharge American obligations under the Convention, the United States 
can legally still be a haven state for hijackers who have managed to flee there 
after the initial landing elsewhere. And if the American legislation is 
regarded as consistent and complete to discharge American obligations under 
the Convention, the same haven possibilities must legally exist for other states 
parties to the Convention. Thus, it appears that the United States, and other 
states interpreting the Convention as the United States seems to, still reject 
"universal jurisdiction" in principle, but apply their legal prescriptions in 
criminal cases only to alleged criminals and acts that have some territorial 
connection with the "asylum" state. 
Two ironies must be pointed out. The establishment of an international 
consensus requiring states to enact municipal "criminal" laws to forbid acts 
analogous to the interference with shipping that formed the basis of the 
British municipal law of "piracy" and the British view of the purported 
international law of "piracy," reintroduced the conception that to be a 
"crime" under international law , the taking had to be unauthorized by some 
sovereign's license, and abandoned the British municipal criminal law 
requirement that the taking to be "piracy" had to be "animo furandi." This is 
the reverse of the evolution of the municipal law deHnition, which had, for 
reasons and in ways amply discussed above, abandoned the notion of passing 
on the validity of a foreign license and emphasized instead the motive of 
private proHt as an essential element of the municipal law offense. It remains 
to be seen whether the word "unlawful" in the Convention and the American 
implementing legislation will eviscerate the deHnition, or tum it into a 
political or international law matter in which the existence of a "license" 
from a party legally empowered to give it will depend on "recognition" of 
the "belligerent" status of the hijackers' organization by political ofHcers of 
the government with custody of the hijackers. 
More striking, the rejection in practice by the United States of the 
"universal jurisdiction" not only permitted, but apparently required, by the 
Convention, highlights the underlying power of the Westphalian legal order 
and its implied limits on the prescriptive jurisdiction of states. Story and 
Wheaton maintained the!: theoretical possibility that American jurisdiction 
unc:ler the Constitution might extend to the acts of foreigners abroad despite 
the uneasiness of Marshall, Johnson and others who in practice limited the 
assertions of jurisdiction to cases in which some American interest could be 
shown to support that jurisdictional assertion. The limits that the inter-
national legal order places upon the reach of any single state's constitution 
were not bluntly acknowledged by the American courts, although hinted at 
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often enough. Now, with every reason, including the positive commitments 
of the United States, to extend American legislative competence to the acts of 
international pariahs, and no apparent reason not to exercise that prescriptive 
jurisdiction, the Congress withheld its legislative hand, restricting its grant of 
jurisdiction to American courts to cases in which that jurisdiction could be 
supported by reference to ancient and deep traditions of the limits to 
prescriptive authority. It remains to be seen whether this self-denying 
approach to prescriptive jurisdiction will be applied in other areas in which 
the American "naturalist," "universal law" courts have taken a less 
restrained position.53 Foreign sovereigns have already begun to make known 
their unhappiness with the unrestrained American assertions of the legal 
power to make rules for the conduct of foreigners abroad on the basis of some 
territorial effects which might or might not pass the threshold oflegal interest 
necessary to support the jurisdictional assertion. 54 
A third recent international Convention dealing with acts done outside of a 
belligerency context which endanger international civil aviation is the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 
Aviation, concluded in Montreal on 23 September 1971.55 The substantive 
offenses covered by the Convention are listed: 
1. Any person commits an offense ifhe unlawfully and intentionally: 
(a) performs an act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if that act 
is likely to endanger the safety of that aircraft; or 
(b) destroys an aircraft in service ... ; or 
(c) places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in service, by any means whatsoever, a 
device or substance which is likely to destroy that aircraft ... ; or 
(d) destroys or damages air navigation facilities or interferes with their operation, if 
any such act is likely to endanger the safety of aircraft in flight; or 
(e) communicates information which he knows to be false, thereby endangering the 
safety of an aircraft in flight ... 56 
The jurisdictional provisions of the 1971 Montreal Convention are, with 
minor changes not relevant to the subject of "piracy" or "universal 
jurisdiction," identical with the jurisdictional provisions at the Hague 
Convention of 1970 analyzed above. To the extent the offenses listed in the 
1971 Convention cannot be construed to be included already in the 1970 
Convention's terms, they are not within the definition of" aircraft piracy" in 
the municipal law of the United States.57 There is no special statute bringing 
the substantive or jurisdictional terms of the 1971 Convention into the 
municipal law of the United States; its substantive terms are apparently 
regarded as included already in American legislation making it a crime under 
the municipal law of the United States for "Whoever," other than a law 
enforcement officer: 
... while aboard, or while attempting to board, any aircraft in, or intended for 
operation in, air transportation or intrastate air transportation, [to have] on or about his 
person or his property a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, which is, or would be, 
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accessible to such person in flight, ... [or to have] placed ... or attempted to have placed 
aboard such aircraft any bomb or similar explosive or incendiary device ... 58 
There is no reflection in the American municipal legislation that this language 
was intended to discharge any international commitment or bring into 
American municipal law the conceptions of a treaty whose meaning would 
have to include a study of the intentions of its other parties and drafters.59 
Although there have been other attempts by individual scholars and some 
statesmen speaking in non-legal contexts to analogize various actions of 
unrecognized belligerents or "criminals" to "piracy," apparently for the 
purpose of encouraging concerted international action to suppress those 
activities, none has succeeded in actually bringing the concept of "piracy" or' 
the word into the international legal arena with meaningful consequences.60 
Attempts to Codify the International Law of Piracy 
Introduction. Throughout the preceding pages little reference is made to the 
writings of learned publicists dealing with their conceptions of the 
international law of "piracy" except for those publicists who, by virtue of 
their eminence and their influence on later writers and state practice, have 
participated in the law-making process more or less directly.tSome, such as 
Grotius and Gentili, established or applied patterns oflegal thought that have 
been influential regardless of the superficiality (in the case of Grotius) or 
frankly adversary twist (in the case of Gentili) of their conclusions. Others, 
such as Molloy, Jenkins, Blackstone and W ooddeson, have been so influential 
on the course of Anglo-American jurisprudence and practice that some 
detailed analysis of both their patterns of thought and their substantive 
summaries of the law of "piracy" have been necessary. Still others, such as 
Wheaton and Dana, were so directly involved in the legal evaluation of 
events and so prestigious within the narrow intellectual world of their place 
and time that it may be taken that their views represented major trends of 
official thought. Of course, many publicists oflesser influence or lesser direct 
involvement in affairs addressed the definition of the law of "piracy" and its 
legal consequences in monographs of more or less cogency. Fortunately for 
the length and coherence of this study, expert analyses of those lesser writings 
were made as part of a codification movement during the first third of the 
20th century and it is unnecessary to repeat those analyses here. It is necessary 
to look at the results of those analyses. 
The League of Nations Effort. On 22 September 1924 the Assembly of the 
League of Nations formally requested the Council of the League to convene a 
committee of experts to prepare a provisional list of the subjects of 
international law the regulation of which by international agreement would 
seem to be most desirable and realizable, to circulate that list to the 
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international community, and to report to the Council on the results.61 
"Piracy" was among the subjects chosen by the "Committee of Experts for 
the Progressive Codification of International Law" set up under this 
arrangement. A Sub-Committee consisting of M. Matsuda of Japan as 
Rapporteur and M. Wang Chung-Hui of China delivered its Report to the 
Committee in January 1926, and the Report, amended by M. Matsuda on 26 
January 1926 as a result of the Committee's deliberations,62 was circulated to 
Governments for their comments on 29 January 1926. 
The Report contains no citations to learned texts or specific state practice 
or cases, thus there is no distinction between those elements that might be 
considered to codify well-based existing international law and those that 
might be new. It is acknowledged in the Report that there is considerable 
"confusion of opinion" among scholars on the subject of "piracy," but that 
confusion is not traced to doctrinal differences or the changing perceptions of 
states over time or any other of the sources of differing opinion analyzed 
above.:It is attributed instead "to failure to draw a clear distinction between 
piracy in the strict sense of the word, as defined by international law, and 
piracy coming under the private laws and treaties of individual states."63 
Thus, the eight articles of the "Draft Provisions for the Suppression of 
Piracy" proposed by the Committee and drafted in fmal form by M. Matsuda 
on 26 January 1926 reflect the assumption that there is a single conception of 
"piracy" in the international legal order reflecting a stable natural law that 
did not change over time. 
The key provisions of this purported codification for purposes of this study 
are the following: 
Article 1: Piracy occurs only on the high seas and consists of the commission for private 
ends of depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons. 
- It is not involved in the notion of piracy that the above-mentioned acts should be 
committed for the purpose of gain, but acts committed with a purely political object will 
not be regarded as constituting piracy. 
Article 2: It is notinvolved in the notion of piracy that the ship should not have the right to 
fly a recognized flag, but in committing an act of piracy the pirate loses the protection of 
the State whose flag the ship flies. 
Article 3: Only private ships can commit acts of piracy. Where a warship, after mutiny, 
cruises on its own account and commits acts of the kind mentioned in Article 1, it 
thereby loses its public character. 
Article 4: Where, during a civil war, warships of insurgents who are not recognized as 
belligerents are regarded-by the regular Government as pirates, third powers are not 
t4er,eby obliged to treat them as such. 
Insurgents committing acts of the kind mentioned in Article 1 must be considered as 
pirates, unless such acts are inspired by purely political motives. 
Article 5: If the crew of a ship has committed an act of piracy, every warship has the right 
to stop and capture the ship on the high sea. 
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On the condition that the affair shall be remitted for judgment to the competent 
authorities of the littoral State, a pursuit commenced on the high sea may be 
continued even within territorial waters unless the littoral state is in a position to 
continue such pursuit itself. 
Article 6: Where suspicions of piracy exist, every warship, on the responsibility of its 
commander, has authority to ascertain the real character of the ship in question. If 
after the examination the suspicions are proved to be unfounded, the captain of the 
suspected ship will be entitled to reparation or to an indemnity, as the case may be. If, 
on the contrary, the suspicions of piracy are confirmed, the commander of the 
warship may either proceed to try the pirates, if the arrest took place on the high sea, 
or deliver the accused to the competent authorities. 
Article 7: Jurisdiction in piracy belongs to the State of the ship making the capture, 
except: (a) in the case of pursuit mentioned in Article 5, paragraph 2; (b) in the case 
where the domestic legislation or an international convention otherwise decides. 
Article 8: The consequences of capture, such as the validity of the prize, the right of 
recovery of the lawful owners, thereward of the captors, are governed by the law of 
the State to which jurisdiction belongs.64 
The replies of Governments to which the Report was sent are very 
lengthy and serious questions were raised with regard to each of the draft 
articles.65 Only one country, Portugal, commented on the definition in the 
light of historical usages of the word "piracy." The Portuguese response 
noted that "the Norman [Viking?] pirates acted on the western coasts of 
Europe, and later the Barbary pirat,es in the Mediterranean" attacked shore 
points; did not confine their piratical activities to the "high seas. "66 But 
aside from the implication that the Committee of Experts/Matsuda 
definition was not a codification of the entire body of pre-existing 
international law relating to "piracy," no deeper analysis was offered. Nor 
was there any significant discussion of the universality principle of Article 
7. There is no explanation available as to whether the second paragraphs of 
Articles 4 and 5 were added with the Huascar incident in mind;67 it looks as if 
somebody was trying to present as if a rule of established law some 
assertions of principle that would cover the British action without unduly 
upsetting the Government of Peru or those scholars, including eminent 
British scholars, who found the actual British position as presented publicly 
to be argumentative and unconvincing. 
The way around the questions of historical and juristic analysis that the 
Committee and its Rapporteur seemed unwilling to try to resolve, or 
unable to resolve in the light of the strong jurisprudential assertions and 
policy positions of many states, was to present the draft without historical 
or jurisprudential analysis, as a draft treaty de lege ferenda; i.e., as a proposal 
for new law regardless of history and theory. This was permissable as 
"progressive" codification within the terms of reference of the Committee, 
and some alteration in the previous conceptions oflaw is inevitable in any 
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codification exercise. Thus, the focus being forward, the consistency of the 
new proposal with history and theory became unimportant.6s 
But this orientation raised questions with regard to the utility of the 
Committee's work on "piracy." Despite the continued use of the word in 
some political and municipal law contexts, it was felt that "piracy" under 
that name was no longer a pressing issue to the international community. In 
the words of the Polish Representative (M. Zaleski) approved by the League 
Council on 13 June 1927: 
It is perhaps doubtful whether the question of Piracy is of sufficient real interest in the 
present state of the world to justify its inclusion in the programme of the conference, if 
the scope of the conference ought to be cut down. The subject is in any case not one of 
vital interest for every State, or one the treatment of which can be regarded as in any 
way urgent, and the replies of certain Governments with regard to it indicate that there 
are difficulties in the way of concluding a universal agreement.69 
This view was adopted by Nicholas Politis as Rapporteur for a Sub-
Committee of the First Committee of the Assembly of the League of Nations, 
who wrote with regard to "piracy," that this question "on which the 
conclusion of a universal agreement seems somewhat difficult at the present 
time, is [ not] important enough to warrant ... insertion in the agenda of the 
proposed Conference. "70 Accordingly, the Assembly of the League of 
Nations, in its Resolution of 27 September 1927 requesting the Council to 
arrange with the Netherlands for the Codification Conference, did not 
include "piracy" in the proposed agenda71 and nothing more came of M. 
Matsuda's Report or the documentation it provoked. 
The Han.'ard Research in International Law 
Introduction. The initiative of the League of Nations in proposing 
activities preparatory to what was expected to be a major codification effort 
prompted the faculty of the Harvard Law School to organize its own research 
effort to contribute to the Codification Conference. A Committee was set up 
by the Harvard Research program to consider the international law of 
"Piracy" independently of the efforts of Matsuda and the League. The 
Reporter was Professor Joseph W. Bingham of Stanford University, who 
chose as his advisers a learned body composed almost exclusively of residents 
of California.72 
The result of the new effort was a full draft Convention of 19 articles, the 
last one, obviously irrelevant to "piracy" and de lege ferenda, being a 
commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes arising out of the interpreta-
tion or application of the Convention and referring to arbitration or 
adjudication by the Permanent Court ofInternationalJustice set up in 1920 or 
the arbitration procedures provided in the Hague Convention of18 October 
1907 for the Pacific Settlement ofInternational Disputes.73 It is thus obvious 
that the drafters of the Convention regarded it as not merely codifying, but 
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also as blending the international law of "piracy" in to the system of legal 
relationships that they believed applied in the world of their time. The draft 
could thus reflect formulations de lege ferenda without violating the 
fundamental conception ofits function, as an aid to the attempts of the time to 
"codify" the rules of international law as they ought to exist rather than as 
they could be shown to exist by an examination of theory and past practice. 
The Theory Behind the Harvard Draft. The Harvard Researchers 
recognized immediately that the public international law relating to 
"piracy," if any such existed, had to be analyzed separately from the 
municipal law said in various countries to apply to "piracy": "[P]iracy under 
the law of nations and piracy under municipal law are entirely different 
subject matters and ... there is no necessary coincidence of fact-categories 
covered by the term in any two systems of law. ''74 One aspect of the 
jurisprudential split between "naturalists" and "positivists" analyzed at such 
length above, is summarized as "a decided difference of fundamental 
theories" between those jurists (whom I have denominated "naturalists") 
who view the "law of nations" as a legal order directly applicable to 
individuals, merely lacking enforcement mechanisms outside of the state 
system, and those jurists (whom I have denominated "positivists ") who adopt 
"the modem orthodox theory" that the law of nations is a law between states 
only.75 
The view that international law is a legal order that applies directly to 
individuals, that states serve only to enforce that law, is considered 
"naturalist" because in the absence of practices indicating that states actually 
adopt that view, and in the absence oflegislative machinery in the legal order 
other than treaty and practice to create or exemplify legal rules, the 
formulation of the "rules" is left to scholars without the interposition of the 
kinds of policy considerations that differentiate legislation from moralization. 
The logic is that of Molloy.76 It is part of the "rule of rea~on" in English 
Common Law.77 The notion traces back ultimately to Cicero and, in a rather 
more strained way, to Aristotle or even Plato. IBut an analysis of the roots of 
"natural law" theory and the evolution of the concept through all its 
ramifications is far beyond the scope of this study and, when pursued deeply 
enough, trenches on philosophical postulates regarding the nature of ideas and 
the relationship between abstractions and reality.78 
The view that international law can be conceived as a "legal" order only if 
restricted to relations among states and other group actors on a stage that 
disregards the notions of individuals who are not members of the cast with 
whom the actors choose to deal, is "positivist" because of the interposition of 
policy judgments in the process by which certain perceived moral rules or 
policy preferences become binding as if "law." 
A rule of thumb for distinguishing between the assertions of "law" on the 
basis of "reason" and assertions of "law" on the basis of th,e implications of 
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policy-based consent, lies in the pattern oflegal argument. Arguments based on 
"reason" assume moral underpinnings and aim at deftning the "issues" (or 
moral principles) touched by a proposed "rule," fmding the highest virtue or 
social function in the formulation favored by the arguer. Arguments based on 
"positive law" disregard "principles" which are viewed as part of the law-
creating legislative process, not part of the process of fmding and applying 
established law. "Positivist" jurists look instead for express or implied consent 
in diplomatic correspondence (in the case of international law) and behavior 
implying the acceptance of rules as an exercise of policy judgment regardless of 
morality. Little weight is given to behavior in the obvious interest of the acting 
state; much to behavior that seems against the immediate interest of the state but 
which the state performs out of an apparent sense of obligation, or of a desire to 
conform to some rules regardless of immediate interest. From this point of view, 
the attitudes of states and their courts towards individuals called "pirates" by 
that state or its judges, are impressive most where the acting state has no basis 
for jurisdiction, no direct legal interest, in the activities complained of. From 
this point of view, British assertions of jurisdiction over foreigners on the high 
seas or in non-European or American territory are of doubtful legal value, 
because the British self-interest in those assertions is so obviously great. But 
British deference to the better-based jurisdiction of others, as in the handing 
over to the United States in 1834 of the "piratical" Captain and crew of a 
Spanish ship whose depredations had Americans as victims and not English 
people,79 and the equivalent relinquishment by the Americans to France in 1822 
of the accused slave traders of the Jeune EugenieSO are far more persuasive as to 
rules of law restricting the legal powers of states precisely because the self-
denials were so clearly performed against the inclinations of the naturalist jurists 
involved. 
All this jurisprudential thought implied a division between, on the one hand, 
publicists classifying the international law of "piracy" as a valid set of rules 
established by universal reason and immediately applicable to individuals but 
enforced only through the intermediacy of states, implying universal jurisdic-
tion and only technical procedural problems of "standing;" and, on the other 
hand, publicists classifying the facts and precedents to deny the very existence of 
an international law of "piracy," but asserting the existence of merely a subset 
of the municipal maritime laws of many states by which jurisdiction over 
foreigners could be asserted on the basis of the nationality of the victim of a 
depredation that did not occur solely within a single vessel or other speciftc 
jurisdiction that could be claimed to be exclusive. 
The Harvard Researchers adopted the latter, "positivist" view: 
Since, then, pirates are not criminals by the laws of nations, since there is no international 
agency to capture them and no international tribun:>J to punish them and no provision in the 
law~ _~f man}' states for punishing foreigners whose piratical offense was committed 
outside the state's ordinary jurisdiction, it cannot truly be said that piracy is a crime or an 
offense by the law of nations.81 
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The Harvard Researchers adopted this view not only for purposes of 
discussion, but as the jurisprudential basis for their draft Convention: 
The theory of this draft convention, then, is that piracy is not a crime by the law of 
nations. It is the basis of an extraordinary jurisdiction in every state to seize and to 
prosecute and punish persons, and to seize and dispose of property, for factual offenses 
which are committed outside the territorial and other ordinary jurisdiction of the 
prosecuting state and which do not involve attacks on its peculiar interests.82 
As to the key jurisdictional point, the Harvard Researchers do not seem to 
have undertaken the research that forms the body of this work. Instead, 
resting on argumentative secondary analyses, much of it by scholars who do 
not seem to have done much primary research either, the Harvard 
Researchers said: 
Indeed it is difficult to find cases of exercise of jurisdiction over piracy which would not 
be supported on one or more of the ordinary grounds. They are very rare.83 
Recourse is had to writers then who support "universal jurisdiction" not on 
the basis of state practice, real incidents, diplomatic correspondence and 
municipal court cases referring to what was asserted to be international law 
by a municipal judge, but on the basis only of the writers' conceptions of the 
structure of the international legal order and flltered interpretations of state 
practice asserted to exist but difficult to demonstrate in particulars. These 
"naturalist" scholars, like Story, are quoted extensively, but their conclusions 
and jurisprudential viewpoint are not adopted. Instead, the most influential 
single publicist whose views are cited at length and for many points of 
approach is a German "positivist," Paul Stiel.84 Stiel regarded the 
jurisprudential split between "naturalists" and "positivists" as a split 
between Anglo-Americanjurists, whom he regarded as "naturalist" despite 
the cases and the writings of John Marshall, Dana and the others,85 and the 
"Kontinentalen" as "positivists" despite the writings of Grot ius, Pufendorf and 
the others.86 From this point of view, and without the detailed analysis 
attempted above, he concluded that a definition is possible: "Piracy is a 
non-political professional course of forcible robbery against nearly all 
countries undertaken at sea. "87 From this he isolated the elements of the legal 
concept, including location (high sea), physical means (force), intention (to 
take property), against whom (anybody), purpose (private enrichment), etc. 
Since this framework excludes privateering or the regular course of raiding 
attributed (falsely) by many European publicists to the Barbary states before 
1830 and to others, and yet such activities had routinely been called "piracy" 
by many scholars and some courts, Stiel had some difficulty. He resolved this 
not by reconsidering his definition, or breaking the concept into two parts, as 
we have done above in the light of the historical evolution of the word 
"piracy" and its usage in different legal and political contexts, but by simply 
asserting the old state-authorized "piracy" to be obsolete, even though there 
seemed to him to be some similarities between the acts for which a "piracy" 
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conviction was obtained by English officials in Singapore in 1858 and the 
Roman practice against Illyrian raiders. His analysis is not deep and his 
assertion about the Malayan case of1858 is unattributed and not evidenced in 
any other known source; his citation to Roman practice is not to any original 
source, but to the great nineteenth century German historian of Rome, 
Theodore Mommsen.88 This leads Stiel into some difficulties when he finally 
comes to consider the doctrinal impact of Sir Stephen Lushington 's opinion in 
the Serhassan (Pirates) case,89 and those difficulties are avoided rather than 
solved by relegating the discussion to the section on political ends, denying 
that the legal concept of "piracy" applies to political actors, but fmding some 
states to be "'capable of being classified "piratical" because they lack political 
goals for their takings.90 It is not at all clear that the desire of the Serhassan 
communities to be free of British visits and other influences, which prompted 
the attack on British warships that led to the punitive raid held by Lushington 
to entitle the victors to the bounty paid to those who engage "pirates," was 
non-political, and Stiel does not explain why he classifies it as such. 
Similarly, the British position in the Huascar correspondence91 is not 
analyzed; instead the British suggestion that unrecognized "rebels" can be 
properly considered "pirates" as a matter ofinternationallaw is dismissed as 
questionable because as long as the rebels' victims are only government 
vessels of their own state nobody would consider them "pirates," and an ad hoc 
denomination as "pirates" solely because of the nationality of the victim 
vessel seems more than any criminal law conception should bear.92 
Now, none of this analysis ofStiel diminishes the utility ofStiel's proposal 
as useful de lege ferenda for the law of "piracy " as it might have been acceptable 
to states in the early years of the 20th century, and the use of Stiel's 
suggestions regardless of the doubtful soundness of the historical and legal 
evidence on which they rest is justified for that purpose. Indeed, there is much 
in Stiel's work that could as well have been based on a more thorough 
analysis, and, regardless of soundness, seems consistent with the conclusions 
possible to reach from the cases and jurisprudential discussions above. In 
taking the general orientation proposed by Stiel as the basis for their own 
draft, the Harvard Researchers thus did not necessarily diminish the value of 
their proposal as an exercise de lege ferenda. 
In their use of earlier scholarship in general, however, the Harvard 
Researchers themselves seemed somewhat confused. Long quotations from 
Stiel93 are preceded or followed with what appear to be supporting quotations 
from a variety of sources addressing different problems from different 
jurisprudential perspectives and at different times. Article 3, the definition of 
"piracy" for purposes of the draft Convention, quotes at some length from 
what seem to be 54 different sources in addition to Stiel, mostly European 
publicists of the 19th century, who were supposed to support in one way or 
another various parts of the proposed defmition. There is no apparent attempt 
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to evaluate those writings by jurisprudential view or any other clue as to 
relative persuasiveness; there is no chronological consistency or indication 
that perhaps the rules found persuasive in Italy or other states deriving their 
experience from Roman or Mediterranean interactions were rejected by 
world-stage actors, like England in the 17th century and later, because of 
possible differences in the political structure of the overall society whose 
trade was to be protected from interference, or the self-image of the state 
accepting or denying the role of world policeman against "piracy."94 Thus, 
the Harvard draft must be evaluated on its own merits as a legislative 
proposal, and cannot be supported as a reflection of a scholarly analysis of 
precedent and theory. Indeed, the Researchers themselves seem to throw up 
their hands in dismay with regard to the definition of "piracy": 
An investigation finds that instead of a single relatively simple problem, there are a 
series of difficult problems which have occasioned a great diversity of professional 
opinion. In studying the content of the [definition] article, it is useful to bear in mind the 
chaos of expert opinion as to what the law of nations includes, or should include, in 
piracy. There is no authoritative definition. Of the many definitions which have been 
proposed, most are inaccurate, both as to what they literally include and as to what they 
omit. Some are impromptu, rough descriptions of a typical piracy.95 
In these circumstances, the legal analysis implicit in the Harvard draft is of 
minimal interest to this study; indeed it is almost wholly lacking in the Report 
itself. 
The Text of the Harvard Research Draft Convention. As an exercise in 
proposing legal formulations taking due account of the confusions of the 
period regarding the concept of "piracy" and the persistence of the concept as 
a factor in justifying some legal results, the Harvard draft has had a major 
impact on the development oflegal thought. For the sake of completeness, the 
entire text is reproduced in Appendix lILA below. But for present purposes 
only the definitional article and the articles dealing with jurisdiction are 
important. They follow: 
Article 3: Piracy is any of the following acts, committed in a place not within the 
territorial jurisdiction of any state: 
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with intent to rob, rape, wound, 
enslave, imprison or kill a person or with intent to steal or destroy property, for private 
ends without a bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right, provided that the act is 
connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or from the air. If the act is connected 
with an attack which starts from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is 
involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national character. 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship with knowledge of 
facts which make it a pirate ship. 
3. Any act ofinstigation or ofintentional facilitation of an act described in paragraph 
1 or paragraph 2 of this article. 
Article 4: 
1. A ship is a pirate ship when it is devoted by the persons in dominant control to the 
purpose of committing an act described in the first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 3, 
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or to the purpose of committing any similar act within the territory of a state by descent 
from the high sea, provided in either case that the purposes of the persons in dominant 
control are not definitely limited to committing such acts against ships or territory 
subject to the jurisdiction of the state to which the ship belongs ... 
Article 6: In a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, a state may 
seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and possessed by pirates, and things or persons 
on board. 
Article 7: 
1. In a place within the territorial jurisdiction of another state, a state may not pursue 
or seize a pirate ship or a ship taken by piracy and possessed by pirates; except that if 
pursuit of such a ship is commenced by a state within its own territorial jurisdiction or in 
a place not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state, the pursuit may be continued 
into or over the territorial sea of another state and seizure be made there, unless 
prohibited by the other state ... 
Article 9: If a seizure because of piracy is made by a state in violation of the jurisdiction of 
another state, the state making the seizure shall, upon the demand of the other state, 
surrender or release the ship, things and persons seized, and shall make appropriate 
reparation. 
Article 13: 
1. A state, in accordance with its law, may dispose of ships and other property 
lawfully seized because of piracy. 
2. The law of the state must conform to the following principles: 
... (b) Claimants of any interest in the property are entitled to a reasonable 
opportunity to prove their claims .... 
Article 14: 
1. A state which has lawful custody of a person suspected of piracy may prosecute and 
punish that person. 
2. Subject to the provisions of this convention, the law of the state which exercises 
suchjurisdiction defmes the crime, governs the procedure and prescribes the penalty •.. 
3. A state may intercede diplomatically to assure [fair and humane treatment] to one 
of its nationals who is accused in another state. 
Weaknesses in the draft are immediately apparent. As to the substance of 
h ffi h " " " d "" I " d ". . "h ? teo ense, w yare rape, woun, ens ave an ImprIson t ere.
There seem to be no cases supporting any such inclusions; the English 
Common Law of "robbery" had become the bedrock of the municipal law 
maritime offense that had come to be called "piracy" in England and America 
since the jurisdictional statute of 1536 was adopted; and "kill" could be 
conceived to have entered the definition in practice. Participation in the slave 
trade had been expressly ruled out of European (including British) definitions 
when that trade was a serious matter in international commerce.96 And if 
" " " d" d ". . "h ld b . I d d I b h rape, woun an ImprIson s ou e mc u e mere y ecause t ey 
are serious and violent offenses, why not "torture" or even generally 
"assault? " 
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Why is there a distinction drawn between acts "committed in a place not 
within the territorial jurisdiction of any state" for the purpose of defining the 
offense, and an act otherwise within the definition (indeed, more broadly 
stated in article four also to include "any similar act") "within the territory 
of a state by descent from the high sea" for the purpose of defining a "pirate 
ship?" The definition of what is "piracy" in article three includes an implied 
definition of who is a "pirate" (whoever commits an act of defined "piracy," 
as well as any of the fringe connections specified in paragraphs 2 and 3 of that 
article). Article four defines a "pirate ship" more broadly. It would seem that 
there could be conceivably a "pirate ship" with no "pirates" on board and 
that had never been involved in the commission of an act of "piracy, "if all its 
assaults were raids ashore. Presumably, to make some sense of this, it was to 
establish a category for ships not wholly lacking nationality from which an act 
of piracy within the definition of article three could be committed. But why, 
if the attacking vessel had national character, should the law of "piracy" 
come into play at all? At least, it is not clear why a ship which had been 
involved in shore raids should be considered a base for piratical acts when it 
acted at sea, and the identical vessel that had not previously committed shore 
raids would not be considered a base for piratical acts on the high sea unless it 
had first lost is national character. And if any vessel had first lost its national .7 
character, it would seem to be within the definition of a base for "piratical" 
acts at sea whether or not it had first been involved in shore raids. Article four 
seems senseless. 
As to jurisdiction, clearly territorial jurisdiction is dominant and, contrary 
to the position of the Disraeli government in support of the actions of Admiral 
de Horsey in the Huascar incident,97 pursuit into the territorial waters of any 
state can be forbidden under article seven. The language shifts the burden to 
the territorial sovereign to prohibit the chase, rather than limiting the 
authority of the policing state to pursue the "pirate, " but that seems to be as 
far as the Harvard Researchers were willing to go to meet the British position 
in principle.98 And Article nine seems to take even that concession back by 
providing not only for a turning over to the territorial sovereign of the 
persons and property seized, but even the paying of reparations. 
Finally, as to "universal" jurisdiction, article 13 refers back to the 
lawfulness of the seizure to determine if the seizing state can apply its own 
law to property seized. If the seizure was "lawful," then it can apply its own 
law, apparently even if there is no identifiable national interest in the incident 
beyond the fact of the seizure by its officials. Article six appears to make 
lawful (although the word is not used) the seizure of "a pirate ship" or a ship 
"taken by piracy and possessed by pirates," and the property connected with 
it; but the same seizure of the same ship and property would appear to be 
unlawful if the ship had been used for depredations only "against ships or 
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the state to which the ship belongs" 
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(article four). In that latter case, the ship would not be classifiable as a "pirate 
ship," and whether the ship's company were "pirates" could not be 
determined until after the seizure; the seizure itself could not be regarded as 
"lawful" when done. And if the ship was not in the first instance "taken by 
piracy," but had been lawfully acquired, or even taken by robbery under the 
law of some territorial state while not on the high sea and not by descent from 
the high sea, then it is not clear that any taking by a second country's officials 
would be "lawful" in the sense of article six. And if article six did not make 
the seizure "lawful," then article 13 would apparently not apply. This 
construction opens up complications of a magnitude that cannot repay further 
analysis in this place since the Convention has never been adopted. But it is 
clear that the provisions as drafted do not represent a simple assertion of 
universal jurisdiction over ships and property involved in "piracy," or of 
universal jurisdiction with a simple exception. This gingerly handling of ships 
and property involved in alleged "piracy" is particularly interesting as 
showing a complete denial of the concepts of a universal law of nations in the 
sense used by Blackstone and the framers of the American Constitution; 
concepts which included all maritime law within the law of nations and 
denied the legal significance of the place, or sovereign authority, of the 
tribunal erected to apply that universal law. The implication is not only that 
there is a cloud on the notion of universal jurisdiction over the goods involved 
in suspected "piracy," but that the same rules of "standing" applied to 
determine which sovereigns' courts could even hear the case; that standing 
ratione materiae and standing ratione personae must both be present in any piracy 
adjudication. 
Article 14 seems to attempt to change that situation with regard to criminal 
trials, but again the universality of the jurisdiction is made to rest on the 
"lawfulness" of the "custody;" and that "lawfulness" seems to depend on the 
interpretation of article six. In the Researchers' commentary to article six no 
clue is given as to the complications involved; they seem to have thought that 
article six merely codified an ancient "right of any state to capture on the 
high sea a foreign ship which has committed piracy or is the booty of 
pirates. "99 But there is no citation to any case or writer to support this grand 
assertion, and, as has been amply demonstrated above, it seems wrong both 
historically and legally to the degree it ignores the general international law 
of "standing. "It seems to reflect the misconceptions of the time growing out 
of British assertions of a world-wide policingjurisdiction taken as a matter of 
policy and applied to foreign military vessels of non-European subordination 
in the absence of animum furandi, and not applied by any state to "pirates" in 
the context of the Harvard Research, i.e., "persons" acting animo furandi 
within article three as "criminals" under the laws of all states. 
There are many other peculiarities and questions raised by the Harvard 
Research draft Convention on Piracy, but since it was presented as an 
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exercise de lege ferenda and was not in fact adopted as such, it seems unnecessary 
to analyze it further in this place. 
The Anglo-American Position. In 1931, while the Harvard Research was still 
underway, there was an incident in the Far East that resulted in the third 
known instance after 1705100 of jurisdiction over accused "pirates" being 
exercised in the absence of a link to some traditional basis for jurisdiction to 
prescribe. The incident occurred between Chinese vessels on the high seas, 
and a capture of the accused "pirates" was effected by a British naval vessel, 
H.M.S. Somme, apparently (the report is not entirely clear) also on the high 
sea. The accused were taken in to the British tribunal in Hong Kong and there 
convicted of "piracy" subject only to the technical legal question of whether 
a mere attempt without an actual robbery was sufficient to constitute 
"piracy" for purposes of a British criminal conviction. The question was 
referred all the way to the highest British tribunal with jurisdiction over 
colonial courts, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The opinion 
was unanimous among the five judges, and delivered by Viscount Sankey, the 
Lord Chancellor. It does not mention any jurisdictional doubts.101 As to the 
point of substance, the opinion seems to treat British precedents and writings, 
including those of Coke, Molloy, Jenkins, and the charge of Sir Charles 
Hedges in R. v. Joseph Dawson102 as if evidentiary of the evolving public 
internationallaw regarding "piracy, " and not merely evidence of an evolving 
British municipal law . The Huascar correspondence is referred to with a single 
sentence reciting the facts followed by another single sentence saying merely: 
"The British Admiral justly considered the Huascarwas a pirate, and attacked 
her. "103 Dr. Lushington's opinions in both the Serhassan (Pirates) and the 
Magellan Pirates cases, and the American case The Ambrose Light104 are cited for 
the proposition that an actual robbery is not required for the crime of 
"piracy" to be completed. There is no-notice of the fact that in all three cases 
there was no animus furandi at all, and that this lack might indicate that 
something other than the English crime of "piracy" might have been 
involved; the assumption is unstated that the legal word "piracy" covers both 
the acts descended from the English notion of robbery within the jurisdiction 
of English Admiralty tribunals and acts ofinterferenc~ with ocean shipping 
whatever the motive, and some assumption of British legal rights to police the 
sea. The confusion of concepts seems to have been complete. 
It is noteworthy that the case is a British case and adopts the British view of 
natural law and British jurisdiction as an incident of an assumed universal 
jurisdiction. Although both the Harvard Research draft Convention and the 
League of Nations draft are cited with approval, there is no analysis of either 
except on the most superficial level. Other European publicists are cited; it 
appears all the citations to sources other than the usual English sources were 
taken from the Harvard Research, at least all those cited seem on cursory 
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inspection to appear also in the Harvard Research and the comprehensiveness 
of the Harvard Research is praised by Viscount Sankey.IOS 
The Privy Council's conclusion was: 
A careful examination of the subject shows a gradual widening of the earlier definition 
of piracy to bring it from time to time more in consonance with situations either not 
thought of or not in existence when the older jurisconsults were expressing their 
opinions .... [T]heir Lordships ... having examined all the various cases, all the various 
statutes and all the opinions of the various jurisconsults cited to them, they have come to 
the conclusion that the better view and the proper answer to give to the question 
addressed to them is ... that actual robbery is not an essential element in the crime of 
piracy jure gentium.t06 
One other case was rescued from oblivion in 1932 and should be mentioned 
as evidentiary of the tendency of Anglo-Americans at the time to assert 
universal jurisdiction even where unnecessary to st'pport the particular 
adjudication, and to cover all "piracy" cases with verbiage of a generality 
unnecessary and inappropriate to criminal proceedings. In 1922 an American 
court in the Philippine Islands affirmed a conviction for "piracy" against 
"certain Moros from the Philippines" who boarded a Dutch boat in the 
territorial waters of an island in the Dutch East Indies, raped the women and 
sank the boat with the men on board {who escaped to shore).:An appeal on the 
basis oflack of jurisdiction was disallowed and the prison term was changed 
to a death penalty for the one of the two defendants who had committed the 
rape.I07 As reported, the decision says: "Nor does it matter that the crime was 
committed within the jurisdictional3-mile limit of a foreign state," because 
"The jurisdiction of pIracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. " 
Since the actual conviction ofLol-Lo was for rape, and it was for the rape and 
not the piracy that he was sentenced to death, this is very difficult to 
understand. Why was a rape within the territorial jurisdiction of the Dutch 
authorities within the jurisdiction of the American authorities also? It is 
especially difficult to understand when the definition given by the tribunal for 
the" crime of piracy" was: "Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the 
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit of 
universal hostility." Even if "rape" fits within the concept of "forcible 
depredation" (which seems doubtful not only as a matter of definition, but 
because the sentence for "piracy" was life imprisonment and the sentence for 
rape was death; it is hard to see a crime with a greater penalty as a lesser 
included offense of a crime with a lighter penalty), it is incomprehensible that 
"on the high seas" means also "within the territorial waters of a foreign 
state. " 
In fact, if the Spanish-rooted law of the Philippines, which is reported to 
have been the law applied, could have been construed to apply to Philippine 
defendants acting abroad, and jurisdiction could have been based on the 
personal power of a sovereign to prescribe rules binding on his subjects 
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wherever they are, the jurisdiction was easily supportable on the basis of 
the nationality of the actors, not universality. As reported, no mention is 
made of the established Constitutional limits to American prescriptive 
jurisdiction as pronounced by the United States Supreme Court in 1820,108 
or the long course of American practice that by 1922 for a hundred years 
had followed that result despite the constant reiteration __ of the theoretical 
possibility of universal jurisdiction which was in fact never asserted to lie 
within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign, but only on the 
high sea. It must be concluded that the case is a unique, or nearly unique, 
example of a colonial court, this time an American one, making up a 
convenient law for itself regardless or precedent, logic or the political 
need to accommodate to the legal powers of neighboring sovereigns. It is 
probably not accidental that the incident occurred and was decided on the 
far fringes of two empires where the legal and political problems would 
not be likely to be significant. 
Nonetheless, it is odd and significant for the trend of thinking in the 
United States that the "Piracy" section in the major compilation of 
American (and some foreign) legally significant practice published in 
1941,109 normally a source of balanced reportage and minimal comment,110 
quotes the passages set out about from both In re Piracy jure gentium and 
People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw without any counterbalancing comment.111 
Universal jurisdiction seems to have been adopted at the official American 
position by 1941, and the contrary cases and logic forgotten. 
The Law of Sea Codification of 1958 
The International Law Commission Draft. As part of a more or less 
complete review of the law of the sea, with an eye to eventual codification, 
the United Nations General Assembly asked the International Law 
Commission to prepare a text that could form the basis for international 
agreement on the law of the sea.112 The text originally prepared in French by 
l.P.A. Frant;ois, the Commission's Special Reporter, titled Regime of the High 
Seas, was published on 1 March 1954113 and contains six articles dealing 
directly with "piracy." Article 23 is the definition. It is Frant;ois's French 
translation of article three of the Harvard Research draft Convention.114 The 
other five articles are French translations of articles 4(1),5,6,10 and 12 of the 
Harvard Research draft. ll5 The provisions set out above dealing with 
jurisdiction and the disposition of goods and persons seized as "piratical" 
simply do not appear in the Frant;ois draft. In his commentary, the Reporter 
acknowledges that his draft is incomplete, saying that only those provisions 
necessary for protection against "piracy" seemed appropriate for the purpose 
of his assignment from the International Law Commission, but that if a more 
elaborate section on "piracy" were desired, the Harvard Research draft 
Convention with its 19 articles would be the best starting point.116 
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The International Law Commission began its discussion of "piracy" at its 
289th meeting on 11 May 1955. At that session, the Commission adopted a 
proposal to include "piracy" in the article drafted by Fran~ois in connection 
with the slave trade, requiring as a matter of abstract principle the 
cooperation of all states in suppressing both activities.117 
The Commission began its discussion of the substantive "piracy" provisions 
of the Fran~ois text, i.e., the Harvard Research draft Convention articles 
defining "piracy" and authorizing foreign state vessels to apprehend 
"pirates," at its 290th meeting the next day. 
It was apparent from the very beginning that the word "piracy" had such 
an overlay of emotion and conflicting meaning that many political 
compromises would have to be made. On 6 May 1955 the Government of 
Poland had submitted formal "observations" on the draft and accused the 
Republic of China of "piracy" in language reminiscent of the translators' 
interpretation of Grotius's, charges against Portugal in the early 17th 
century:118 
Foreign men-of-war assisted by airplanes forced to stop Polish ships maintaining 
peaceful commercial communication with the Chinese People's Republic .... The[se] 
acts committed in the China seas constitute a most serious crime-namely, piracy .•.. 
The formulation of article 23 of the draft is in conflict with established views on piracy. 
It should be clear that the words "bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right" cannot 
be used in connexion with such actions as robbery, rape, wounding, enslavement and 
killing. Similarly the words "for private ends" should be omitted, since no ends, even 
when described by the perpetrators as not being "private" (i.e., "public") can justify 
acts of piracy.119 
After an acrimonious exchange among the Chinese, Czech and Soviet 
members of the Commission, it was decided that the Polish note was actually 
a complaint against the Republic of China lying outside the competence of the 
Commission.120 The subject of nationalist Chinese naval vessels intercepting 
Soviet, Polish and other countries' vessels heading for mainland Chinese ports 
after the Communist victories had resulted in the establishment of a 
Communist government in China in 1949, had already been raised in the 
United Nations, and attempts there to call the Republic of China's actions 
"piratical" had been rejected in December 1954 by the Ad Hoc Political 
Committee (composed of all the members of the General Assembly}.121 
Nonetheless, in introducing the substantive definition of his article 23, the 
Reporter reintroduced the subject. He set out the debate between those jurists 
who regard animum furandi as an essential element of the international (as 
distinct from the municipal) law "offense," and those who do not. Fran~ois 
rejected the argument of the Polish memorandum on the ground that the 
Chinese vessels interfering with Polish shipping were public vessels.l22 He 
sided with those who regard the animum furandi as an essential element of the 
international law offense. Other essential elements in his view were a 
location on the high seas, and that the offense be committed by one ship 
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against another. Since his own draft, copied from the Harvard Research draft, 
includes some land activity within the definition, it is hard to understand the 
rigidity of Fran~ois's presentation on the second point. All three of his 
"essential elements" seem to be derived from the opinions of others with no 
analysis of their consistency with actual state practice, cases and the deeper 
levels of theory. There seems to be no reflection of the possibility that the 
requirement of animo furandi is historically derived from municipal law 
concepts and in practice not applied to limit the activities of the British in 
their attempts in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to keep open the sea 
lanes for peaceful traffic. Most disturbing, there seems to be no reflection in 
the presentation of M. Fran~ois that the Harvard Research which he was 
presenting as the basis for discussion was drafted by its authors de lege ferenda 
and that those authors themselves regarded their disordered compilation of 
quotations as evidence not of any clear underlying concept of "piracy" in the 
international legal order, but just the opposite, as evidence that no clear 
conception could be derived directly from the writings of publicists or an 
examination of historical correspondence and cases. And while the research 
set out in some detail above seems to indicate that the Harvard Researchers 
were wrong, that there is indeed a complex order in the many uses of the 
word "piracy, " equivalent research and jurisprudential analysis are not found 
in the Harvard Research nor were they supplied by Fran~ois. 
The Commissioners themselves quickly made it clear that each had his own 
special conception of "piracy," and his own notion of the historical and 
theoretical bases for that conception, excluding other conceptions as 
incorrect. For example, M. Georges Scelle (France) argued that "piracy" 
must include land-based activity, because otherwise the Barbary corsairs 
"would not have been pirates." On this basis he accused M. Fran~ois of "a 
methodological error. "123 Mr. Zourek asserted that animus furandi was not an 
essential element on the ground that in his view the Nyon Treatyl24 included 
within the notion of "piracy" actions by submarines as state-owned vessels 
acting for what they conceived to be a public purpose.l25 These and other 
arguments were made and the 290th meeting broke up in some polite 
confusion. The next day, M. Fran~ois presented a redraft, and a new draft 
based on the previous day's discussion was also presented by one of the 
Commissioners, Mr. Douglas L. Edmonds (United States of America). The 
Commission then decided to postpone the discussion of the definition of 
"piracy" while the two new drafts were examined.l26 
At its 292nd meeting, on 16 May 1955, the International Law Commission 
finally began to discuss substantive questions on the basis of a working draft. 
The draft prepared by M. Fran~ois was immediately challenged by Mr. A. E. 
F. Sandstrom (Sweden), who presented yet another counter-draft. The first 
point at issue was whether it would be proper to call "pirates" those who 
descended from the sea to perform their raids on land; Fran~ois said not, on 
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the basis of "the Harvard report, together with the whole weight of 
jurisprudence. "127 Sandstrom did not challenge this patently erroneous 
interpretation of both the Harvard Research draftl28 and such precedents as 
the treatment of the Barbary states and such cases as the Serhassan (Pirates) 
(which Frant;ois seems to have simply ignored), but defended his view as 
within the Commission's responsibility "to promote the progressive 
development of international law rather than its codification," arguing as a 
matter of policy that it was "inadmissable" that a warship should have to 
refrain from seizing" a pirate vessel" on the high sea because the act of piracy 
had been committed in territorial waters or on land.l29 The Commission then 
voted by 6 to 4 with 1 abstention to reject the Sandstrom draft and work from 
the Frant;ois redraft.130 But although the implication of this might seem to be 
that the Commissioners felt they were codifying a more or less clear legal 
conception, in fact the entire discussion that followed was based on policy 
considerations; there are no citations to cases or accepted rules of law that 
might apply by analogy. The International Law Commission seems in silence 
to have construed itself into a legislative session, while on the surface 
accepting Frant;ois's view that codification was its function. Nobody noted 
that Frant;ois's view was itself inconsistent with his basing his "codifying" 
text on another text, prepared by the Harvard Researchers, which was 
frankly non-codifying but de lege ferenda. 
Acting thus as a legislative session, the International Law Commission 
agreed that territory not subject to the jurisdiction of any particular state, 
such as guano islands, should be assimilated to the high sea for the purpose of 
defining the location in which the law regarding "piracy" should apply.131 A 
proposal that ships which were suspected of being "pirate ships" within the 
sense of the draft should be subject to seizure only on the high sea and there 
only by properly authorized warships, but not police boats, was adopted 9 to 1 
with 2 abstentions on the stated ground that a different rule "might encourage 
abuse, "132 although why police vessels should abuse their authority more than 
warships seems difficult to grasp and was not addressed. A short discussion of 
the differences between "piracy" and "mutiny" occurred, Frant;ois taking 
the position that an attack on a second vessel should be necessary and 
Sandstrom that if the entire vessel were seized on the high sea by passengers m· 
crew, not merely property within it, then acts of "piracy" would have 
occurred and should be treated as such in the draft.133 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice 
(United Kingdom) referred to the primacy of the law of the flag state in cases 
of mutiny, concluding that until the seized vessel acted against some other, 
committed a different and later "act of piracy':' it would be premature to 
classify its seizure as "piracy" even if the whole vessel were taken. Although 
no vote was reported, there seems to have been a consensus that the approach 
taken by Fitzmaurice was persuasive. l34 Fitzmaurice's precise language, as 
recorded, seems excessively cautious: "[I]t would be preferable to make it 
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clear that piracy was not confined to acts committed on the ship itself, but 
that it essentially consisted in acts committed against another ship or persons 
not on the pirate vessel itself. "135 Indeed, read carefully, this seems to mean 
the opposite of what was apparently intended; that acts within a single vessel 
might well be denominated "piracy"-the first clause seems to say that that 
was the normal case, which is wholly inconsistent with the context; the 
second that the normal case involved a second ship or persons, but not 
necessarily SO.I36 The point was not raised again, and the two-ships approach 
was taken in all the later drafts. 
At the 293rd meeting on 17 May 1955, three minor points were resolved 
first. An attack by one aircraft against another was excluded from the 
definition of "piracy" by a vote of 8 to 3 with 1 abstention. Immediately 
afterwards, it was decided by consensus that an attack by an aircraft against a 
vessel should be denominated "piracy," and that provision should be included 
in the draft allowing military aircraft to take steps against ships committing 
"acts of piracy. "137 
The longest discussion was reserved for a renewed consideration of the 
Chinese seizure of Polish merchant vessels and the question of "state piracy." 
S. B. Krylov {Soviet Uruon} pressed hard to have his view of the Nyon 
Agreement adopted as containing the" seeds of a new principle" regardless of 
the precedent of the Barbary corsairs. Jaroslav Zourek {Czechoslovakia} 
concurred on the basis of the inadmissability of "superior orders" to 
exculpate a war criminal, although why he thought that "pirate" was an 
appropriate synonym for "war criminal" was not made clear. Fitzmaurice 
objected on the ground that the Nyon Agreement was based on the 
assumption that the parties had agreed not to authorize the kind of submarine 
warfare that was involved, and that therefore the acts could only be classified 
as for "private ends;" that the Nyon Agreement was therefore irrelevant to 
the argument made by Krylov. He also pointed out that acts of aggression or 
acts of war were not "piracy" in any known sense. Several members then 
questioned the impact of the concept of "public ends" on revolutions, 
denying that revolutionaries should properly be classified as "pirates" for any 
purpose and that in any case it was beyond the Commission's charge to 
attempt at this time to codify rules appropriate to the conduct of civil wars. 
After active discussion, Krylov's proposal was defeated by 10 votes to 2 with 1 
abstention, and the words "for private ends" were specifically approved by 
11 votes to 2. At this.point, the entire text was referred to the Commission's 
drafting committee as non-controversial.138 
The Product of the drafting committee was reported at the close of the 7th 
session.139 The changes from the Harvard Research draft are substantial, and 
seem to reach far beyond the normal scope of a drafting committee's 
authority, but there is no record of the reasons for those changes beyond what 
has been related above. 
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Article 13 begins the section on "piracy:" 
Article 13: All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of 
piracy on the high seas. 
Obviously, the general provision drafted to apply only to the slave trade, then 
expanded to include "piracy," had been shrunk back to its original size by 
dropping its original inspiration and leaving it applicable only to the 
afterthought, "piracy." In the commentary, the debt to the Harvard 
Research is repeated but no support is given for this article except the 
assertion that it "lays down a sound principle." 
The most important changes are, of course, in the definition: 
Article 14: Piracy is any of the following acts: 
1. Any illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation directed against 
persons or property and committed for private ends by the cew [sic: presumably crew] or 
the passengers of a private vessel or a private aircraft: 
(a) Against a vessel on the high seas other than that on which the act was committed, 
or 
(b) Against vessels, persons or property in territory outside the jurisdiction of any 
states .. .140 
Six points of substance were specifically noted by the Commission in its 
formal commentary: 
First, that "the intention to rob (animo furandi) is not required." Hatred or 
revenge are cited as motives equally appropriate for "piracy." Of course, 
animo furandi has always meant something a bit more complex than the 
intention to rob,141 but the drafting committee cannot be faulted for petty 
overgenerality in a mere comment. Presumably the reference to hatred and 
revenge reflected some knowledge of the views of Joseph Story in 1844142 but 
precisely what knowledge is unclear. 
Second, the Commission simply stated without discussion: "The acts must 
be committed for private ends," thus crystalizing the rejection of Poland's 
complaint against the Republic of China. 
Third, the Commission reported, "Save in the case provided for in article 
15 [mutiny by the crew] piracy can be committed only by merchant vessels, 
not by warships." This assertion split the Commission, some of whose 
members cited the "Nyon Arrangement" of 1937143 as evidence of a 
development of general international law giving all states a new right, or 
even an obligation, to suppress certain violations of the laws of war by one 
party during a civil war in order to safeguard freedom of navigation by 
neutrals on the high seas. The Commission as a whole rejected that view 
solely on policy grounds: -
In view of the immunity from interference by other ships which warships are entitled to 
claim, the seizure of such vessels [warships] on suspicion of piracy might involve the 
gravest consequences. Hence the Commission feels that to assimilate unlawful acts 
committed by warships to acts of piracy would be prejudicial to the interests of the 
international community.144 
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This judgment, that the enforcement of the laws and customs of war at sea in 
situations of belligerency , whether or not recognized, is less important to the 
world community than freedom of third party navigation on the high seas, 
does not seem to rest on any expressed legal analysis. As an unreasoned 
perception of the priority of two different values protected by the 
international legal order it seems entitled to some respect but not much. The 
same conclusion could have been reached along more traditional legal lines by 
noting that no states not parties to the Nyon Agreement appear to have 
modified their behavior in reliance on its formulation145 and that its 
formulation itself does not make the unlawful acts "piracy" as such, but only 
attributes to them the legal results of "piracy" as a matter of analogy. But the 
penchant of international lawyers, even arbitral tribunals and persons acting 
officially within the authority of the International Law Commission, to 
pretend to the authority of legislators despite restrictions on their actual 
authority and their place in the legal order has been frequently documented 
and needs no further comment here.l46 There is no hint from the records of the 
International Law Commission that the concept of warships as "piratical" 
might have ancient roots implying imperial authority to suppress the 
activities of "states" or purporting to defend a world order analogous to the 
Roman hegemonias or the British vision of free seas in the nineteenth century, 
and it seems safe to speculate that the split among the Commissioners 
reflected instead a Soviet position aimed at the rump Government of China in 
Taiwan without much thought to possible legal implications beyond the 
immediate horizon. It is, of course, possible that some Soviet or Polish or 
other jurists were driving toward a world order model in which the legal 
power to go to war would be restricted by community consensus, or by some 
natural law perception making legal some changes of government in a 
"progressive" direction and making resistance to those changes somehow 
illegal. But this begins to carry speculation too far. There is no hint of such 
logic in the records of the Commission or its references to Nyon. 
Fourth, the Commission rejected the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century American and later British notion that "piracy" could be a proper 
label for depredations on land even if.by bands based on ships: 
Piracy can be committed only on the high seas or in a place situated outside the 
territorial jurisdiction of any State, and cannot be committecl within the territory of a 
State or in its territorial sea. 
In commenting on its own conclusion, the Commission recorded the fact of 
some dissent, did not attempt to justify the extension of the definition from 
the "high seas" to "a place situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of any 
State," and simply referred acts within the territorial jurisdiction of a state, 
including its territorial waters, to "the State affected. "147 For legal support 
the Commission mentioned only "the line taken by most writers on the 
subject." There was no attempt to explain away the Serhassan (Pirates) casel48 
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and the many writings flowing from it, and British practice using the word 
"piracy" to justify Imperial adventures. Nor was any nod made in the 
direction of People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw149 in which an American tribunal had 
rejected Dutch territorial jurisdiction as possibly removing the case from the 
"piracy" jurisdiction of the United States. 
The Commission addressed its extension of the definition of "Piracy" to 
include acts by aircraft against vessels on the high seas also by mere assertion: 
Acts of piracy can be committed not only by vessels on the high seas, but also by aircraft, 
if such acts are committed against vessels on the high seas.1SO 
In what purports to be an explanation, there is merely a denial that air-to-air 
acts anywhere can be regarded as acts of piracy, and an affirmation that air to 
sea depredations "might, in the Commission's view, be assimilated to acts 
committed by a pirate vessel. " The only hint of an explanation or logic is the 
purely technical one that air to air acts "are outside the scope of these draft 
articles" which are presumably confined to the law of the sea. But why acts in 
airspace over the high seas are not regarded as part of the law of the sea for the 
purpose of defining "piracy" while Antarctica and guano islands are part of 
that law for that purpose, and why, if all aspects of air law are regarded as 
beyond the limits of investigation, the" effects" doctrine is thought sufficient 
to bring some airborne action into the law of the sea but not other airborne 
action, are questions not asked or answered in the Commission's report. 
Quaere, an airborne attack on an Antarctic base? There is an obvious 
inconsistency between this section and the preceding one unaddressed by the 
Commision. 
Finally, the Commission excluded mutiny from its definition: 
Acts committed on board a vessel by the crew or passengers and directed against the 
vessel itself, or against the persons or property on the vessel cannot be regarded as acts of 
piracy.151 
This is explained as tallying "with the opinions of most writers." 
Article 15 is a mere technical article assimilating "acts of piracy" 
committed by a warship or military aircraft whose crew has mutinied to acts 
committed by private vessels. The official comment explains that this is 
necessary legally in order that a state aircraft or vessel can be treated as one 
engaging in "acts of piracy," implying that without, such a provision the acts 
might be classifiable as acts of war. 
Article 16 is another technic~l article defining "pirate ship" for purposes of 
the codification as a ship "devoted by the persons in dominant control to the 
purpose of committing an act described" in the part of article 14 analyzed 
above. 
Article 17 reverses the American naturalist approach that Justice Story had 
been most successful with, the one that gave to American courts jurisdiction 
over foreign vessels that in the opinion of the Supreme Court had lost national 
character as a result of their piratical depredations;152 it also made clear the 
o 
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rejection by the Commission of whatever persuasiveness the logic of the 
British Government had in the Huascar correspondence:153 
Article 17. A ship or aircraft may retain its national character although it has become a 
pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of national character is determined by the 
law of the State from which it was originally derived.1S4 
But while reserving to the flag state the legal power to apply its prescriptive 
and enforcement jurisdiction to the vessel, the classification as a "pirate ship 
or aircraft" gives to a third state all that it would need in the way of legal 
authority to arrest the vessel and, subject to other terms of the purported 
codification, try the crew for "piracy" and distribute the seized property. 
Since the law of Prize would not seem to apply outside of a "war," and the 
entire approach negates any implication that the struggle against "pirates" is 
to be regarded as involvement in "war" in any sense-indeed, at least in 
England and America in the nineteenth century the word "piracy" was 
deliberately used to avoid the application of the law of war to foreign vessels 
interfering with seaborne commerce,155-it would seem that this preservation 
of flag state jurisdiction would be inconsistent with any provisions allowing a 
capturing state to apply its law to the persons of property on board the vessel. 
This inconsistency is created for the draft by article 18, and does not seem to 
have been noticed by the Commission. 
Article 18 is the one containing the legal results of all the labeling that W;lS 
the subject of the previous articles: 
Article 18. On the high seas or in any other place not within the territorial jurisdiction of 
another State, any State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft or a ship taken by piracy and 
under the control of pirates, and property or persons on board. The courts of that state 
[lower case sic] may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and determine the action to 
be taken with regard to the property, subject to rights of third parties acting in good 
faith.l56 
The Commission's commentary on this draft article says merely that it 
"gives any State the right to seize pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and 
to have them tried by its courts," going on to emphasize that a ship flying a 
flag to which it is not entitled is not thereby a pirate ship; it must commit acts 
of piracy first. Except for the obscure reference to rights of third parties 
acting in good faith, there seems to be no notice that the substantive law of the 
seizing states might be inappropriate as the law to measure property rights in 
the pirate ship or goods taken in it; that the preservation of flag state 
jurisdiction in the previous article makes its law the proper governing law in 
cases in which that state maintains its national interest in the character of the 
vessel or aircraft. There is no explanation of the reference to "third parties 
acting in good faith;" whether that relates to states or individuals, prior 
owners or later transferees of property taken by "pirates," or anything else. 
No guidance is given either as to a conflict oflaws rule to determine which 
law a court should apply to a determination of substantive property rights in 
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property possessed by "pirates," or as to whatever substantive law might be 
found in the international legal order regarding such goodS.157 The "penalties 
to be imposed" in the second sentence seem to relate to the formal action to be 
taken by the courts of the capturing state against "pirates." Taken in context, 
it illustrates the way in which the Commission resolved the conflict between 
"naturalist" jurists who view "piracy" as a crime against international law 
seeking only a tribunal with jurisdiction to apply that law and punish the 
criminal, and "positivist" jurists who view "piracy" as solely a municipal law 
crime, the only question of international law being the extent of a state's 
jurisdiction to apply its criminal law to an accused foreigner acting outside 
the territorial jurisdiction of the prescribing state. This conflict was noted at 
the beginning of the Harvard Research which was the basis for the 
International Law Commission's work.158 The resolution was to leave 
unexpressed the frankly "positivist" conclusion of the Harvard Research159 
and to treat "piracy" as if a "crime" whose elements were defined by 
international law (set out in article 14 of the Commission's draft) but whose 
enforcement was left to municipal law: the "naturalist" model. Presumably, 
the failure of a state to conform its municipal law definition of "piracy" to 
that proposed by the Commission as if a codification of existing international 
law in the absence of prior legislative acts except such as might be considered 
to flow in the international legal order from the municipal criminal law 
practices of states, would be considered itself a violation by the state of its 
obligations under general international law. This approach avoids all 
considerations of "standing," the legal link between the incident or the 
accused or his victim on the one side, and the state seeking to extend its 
jurisdiction on the other. It adopts the locus deprehendatis rule of R. v. Green,160 
merely restricting the legal power of a state to seize "pirates" to the high seas 
and other places "not within the territorial jurisdiction of another state," 
which seems to coincide with the maximum reach of enforcement jurisdiction 
anyhow, since no state has the legal power to make an arrest in the territory of 
another state without that other state's permission. What would happen if a 
state operating under the law as purportedly codified by the Commission 
made an arrest in foreign territory with the consent of the territorial sovereign 
is left unmentioned. It is therefore unclear whether the Commission 
envisaged that sort of cooperation and would regard it as proper but outside 
the framework it felt required codification, or intended to restrict 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by requiring each sovereign to enforcS! the 
general international law of "piracy" without help in its own territory, or 
simply did not consider the lacunae in its conceptual framework for a draft 
codification of the law. There is no explanation as to why this "natural law" 
approach was taken by the Commission, and no attempt to grapple with the 
conceptual difficulties that persuaded the Harvard Research drafters to take a 
different approach. 
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Article 19 provides that a state seizing as if for "piracy" a vessel or aircraft 
whose behavior had not provided adequate grounds for such an interference 
with rights of navigation on the high seas, is liable to the flag state for any 
damage caused by that seizure. And article 20 restricts the right of seizure 
because of "piracy" to "warships and military aircraft.'~ The reason for this 
latter provision is explained on the basis that "other state-owned vessels do 
not provide the same safeguards against abuse. "161 No consideration is given 
to police or coast guard arrests or to the possible survival of the "natural 
right" asserted by Molloy for private vessels to make the equivalent of a 
"citizen's arrest, "162 and no explanation is offered for that "codification." 
The final article of this section of the International Law Commission's 
draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 21, deals with the right of 
visit on the high sea, limiting that right to warships (without mention of 
military aircraft, a possibility specifically included in Article 20) and 
restricting it to three circumstances, of which one is that there is "reasonable 
ground for suspecting ... that the vessel is engaged in piracy. "163 
The draft and commentary were distributed by the International Law 
Commission to Governments with replies requested before 1 January 1956164 
and six Governments addressed the articles dealing with "piracy."I65 Those 
replies were summarized by the Special Rapporteur G. P. A. Fran~ois) with 
his own comments on them and distributed on 1 May 1956 to the members of 
the Commission.166 These new documents were further considered by the 
Commission on 9 May 1956.167 
Regarding the introductory general article, article 13, The Netherlands 
suggested that "piracy on the high seas" seems inconsistent with article 14's 
definition of "piracy," which allows for the legal word to apply to some 
activities not on the high seas. The Rapporteur suggested deleting the 
reference to "the high seas" in article 13, pointing out that "piracy" is fully 
defined for purposes of the draft in article 14; thus the Rapporteur agreed 
with The Netherlands' position.168 But the Commission adopted the 
suggestion ofMr . Jean Spiropoulos (Greece) to add: "or in any other place not 
withiJ! territorial jurisdiction of another State. "169 The reason for choosing 
this rather prolix and not entirely grammatical solution to the problem raised 
by the comment of The Netherlands is clear from the report of the 
International Law Commission. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom) 
had pointed out that the intention of article 14(1)(b) in referring to acts 
"outside the jurisdiction of any State" had been to allow the definition to 
cover the case of "piracy committed on desert islands," and that from this 
point of view the proposal of The Netherlands merely to delete the restrictive 
language of the draft article 13 was logical. The counter-argument 
apparently was that posed by Mr. Radhabinod Pal (India), who pointed out 
that the phrase "on the high seas" refers not to the definition of "piracy" but 
to the place in which measures of cooperation among states would be 
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required. In order to carry this affirmative duty, he suggested that that phrase 
should be retained and supported Spiropoulos's proposal to add language 
referring to other places in which that cooperation would be required.170 A 
drafting committee eventually cleaned up the grammar, and the following 
language was incorporated in the final draft submitted by the International 
Law Commission to the United Nations General Assembly and ultimately 
adopted without change as article 14 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas: 
All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy on the 
high seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State.l7l 
It is repeated with a minor stylistic change ("possible extent" changed to 
"extent possible") as article 100 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea.l72 
The definition article, article 14, received substantive comments from 
China, the Union of South Africa and The Netherlands. China suggested 
expanding the definition to include all shipboard violence and threats of 
violence when coupled with taking over command of the vessel, thus making 
"mutiny" a subspecies of "piracy." The Chinese argument to support this 
position was not based on history or legal precedent or the needs of the 
international order, but solely on the existence of two definitions of "piracy" 
in the Chinese Criminal Code173 and uncited, unquoted, asserted "opinions" 
of unnamed authorities. These provisions seem to assume universal standing 
unless, as with the American definition of about 115 years earlier,174 some 
basis for restricting the reach of Chinese law is assumed to exist in the 
international legal order. If not, every mutiny in any foreign vessel anywhere 
in the world involving persons of solely non-Chinese (even solely ascertained 
foreign nationality in their own flag vessel) would come within the scope of 
the Chinese criminal law system. Since the offense we call "mutiny" is, in the 
Chinese Criminal Code, merely "deemed" to be piracy, it is very difficult to 
attribute this possible reading of the Code to some notion of piracy jure 
gentium. Thus, in the absence of any precedents for Chinese exercise of 
jurisdiction over the acts of foreign mutineers in foreign vessels outside 
Chinese waters, it must be supposed that the expansive interpretation given 
to the reach of Chinese legislation by the Government of the Republic of 
China reflected similar expansive British assertion during the heyday of 
colonial enterprise, and not the intentions of th~ Chinese legislators of the 
Code (who used the word "deemed") or the experience of the United States 
and other powers who found such broad assertions to be unworkable in 
practice in the absence of complete dominance of the seas because 
inconsistent with international legal principle. 
The Netherlands comment on article 14 also referred to "mutiny" 
(although not with that word) as a subspecies of "piracy," referring to 
Higgins-Colombos,175 Ortolan,176 Oppenheim-Lauterpacht,177 Gidell78 and 
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the British case of the Attorney General of Hong Kong tf. Kwok-a-Sing. 179 But The 
Netherlands did not press the point, concluding that the prior language of the 
Commission was correct as a matter of policy growing out of the distribution 
of jurisdiction under the international legal order. "The community of States 
need not interfere with a change of authority on board the ship so long as the 
acts of the mutineers are not directed outwards. "180 
The Rapporteur's comment dated 1 May 1956 says merely that "The 
Commission did not wish to adopt the broad definition of piracy advocated by 
the Chinese Government, "181 and does not mention the position of The 
Netherlands. In the Commission's discussion of 9 May 1956 there is only 
passing mention of the point, and the provision of article 14 that to be 
"piracy" the act must be committed by the personnel of one vessel (or 
aircraft) against another, was retained without substantive modification. 
Other matters were discussed by the Commission in connection with 
article 14 on 9 May 1956. The Union of South Africa had rai definition 
affect state vessels operated for commercial purposes? In addition, Mr. 
Yuen-li Liang, Director of the Codification Division of the United Nations 
Secretariat Offtce of Legal Affairs, acting as Secretary of the International 
Law Commission, raised again the question of whether the definition should 
include acts done any place other than the high seas.l83 The Netherlands had 
also noted the point made by South Africa about state-owned vessels 
suggesting that article 14 be reworded to make it clear that it does not apply to 
"State-owned vessels having a public function. "184 In his report oft May 1956 
the Rapporteur had agreed with both the South African and Netherlands 
points in substance. He suggested a redrafted article 14 eliminating "persons 
or property" as objects of "piratical" attack from the draft; supplementing 
the original reference to "private vessel or ... aircraft" with a reference to 
any "vessel or aircraft in co~ercial service" (thus including some state-
owned vessels or aircraft)l85 and inserting the words "persons or property" as 
possible objects of piratical attack in subparagraph (a) to parallel the language 
of subparagraph (b).l86 
In the discussions of the Commission on 9 May 1956, Mr. S. B. Krylov 
(U.S.S.R.) and Mr. Jaroslav Zourek (Czechoslovakia) repeated their objec-
tions previously stated.l87 Mr. Zourek in particular made an elaborate 
argument for revising the definition to include as an "act of piracy" all 
peace-time depredations even when committed for political ends, by 
warships or military aircraft, when committed from the high seas even if 
against ships, persons or goods located in territorial waters, internal waters or 
on land, unless those acts were denominated acts of aggression.1SS This 
suggestion seems to have provoked no response in the Commission despite its 
being consistent with a traditional use of the word "piracy" prior to and even 
during the nineteenth century; probably, the earlier Czech-Soviet political 
attempt to embarrass the Republic of China dominated the thinking of the 
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non-Communist members of the Commission, and the basic criminal law 
definition of "piracy" seemed incompatible with a world order model in 
which there was no imperial legislator. Much more could, of course be said 
about the possible attractiveness of this definition when the consequences of 
universal criminality are sought to be imposed on foreign "terrorists" acting 
abroad but this seems not the place to elaborate further on the theme.189 
The bulk of the Commission's energy was spent discussing the desirability 
of including aircraft within the definition. As to that, an interjection by Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice proved the most influential. He pointed out that the main 
legal result of the definition was to determine which vessels (and aircraft) a 
warship of any nation would have the legal right to visit and seize. For that 
reason, it was necessary that the definition be precise as to its physical locus: 
high sea and territory not subject to the jurisdiction of any state. As to 
aircraft, the problem of depredations by aircraft was both novel and 
potentially real, and enforcement of the law by aircraft was also feasible. 
There seemed to be consensus that these arguments for progressive 
development of the law in the Commission's draft were persuasive, although 
Messrs. Krylov and Zourek preserved their opposition to the. entire 
conception. With two dissents, therefore, the article was adopted subject to 
"drafting changes in the light of the discussion." 
The changes wrought by the drafting committee were major but seem not 
to have been discussed in published documents. The redrafted article, article 
39 of the Commission's final draft, appears as Article 15 in the 1958 Geneva 
Convention of the High Seas and, with stylistic changes, as article 101 of the 
1982 United Nations Convention:l90 
Piracy consists in any of the following acts: 
1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
( a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircaft, or against persons or property 
on board such [aJ ship or aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State. 
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
3. Any act of incitement or of international facilitation of an act described in 
subparagraph 1 or subparagraph 2 of this article. 
In the final version adopted into the Geneva Convention the only changes are 
the addition of the italicized words and the deletion of the bracketed "a." The 
stylistic changes in the 1982 Convention were to change the period at the end 
of paragraph 1(b) to a semicolon, and to change the passive "incitement" and 
"intentional facilitation" in paragraph 3 to the active "inciting" and 
"intentionally facilitating." 
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This final version appears to be at least as much the product of exhaustion 
and the dynamics of a group drafting committee as oflogic or a knowledge of 
jurisprudence and history. Read carefully, it seems to revive the law of 
privateering by its reference to "illegal" acts, implying that some 
depredations for private ends might be "legal, "191 and leaving no explanation 
of how sense is to be made of a purported definition of a" crime" that rests on 
an undefined and unreferenced concept of prior "illegality": Illegal under 
what law? By whose determination?l92 An attempt by the United Kingdom to 
rectify its own oversight in not raising the question earlier as to whether an 
"attempt" should not have been included with "voluntary participation" as 
part of the "crime" of "piracy"193 was defeated during the Geneva 
negotiating session, indicating surely that by then no body was willing to focus 
seriously on the formulation. Further comment seems unnecessary regarding 
the irony that the International Law Commission failed throughout its 
deliberations concerning article 14 to focus on the evolving patterns of 
jurisprudential thought and political and economic activity that lay behind 
the writings some of the Commissioners seem to have found persuasive; that 
instead primary reliance for background information was placed on the 
Harvard Research, which had enough jurisprudential analysis to take a 
positivist position and deny the consistency of contending schools of thought, 
but too little analysis of deeper jurisprudential currents and historical 
movement to make it possible to organize the mass of material in a form fit for 
codification except de lege ferenda; and that, even after some discussion by the 
Commission of one of the very few substantive points discussed with any 
depth at all, relating to the inclusion de lege ferenda of aircraft within the 
definition of vehicles that might be called "piratical" for the purpose of 
allowing official search and seizure on the high seas, the point was relegated 
to a drafting committee that then ignored it while engaging in major 
redrafting that it had not been supposed to undertake. 
Article 15 in draft assimilated acts against third country vessels or warships 
and aircraft whose crews had mutinied to acts of "pirate" ships and aircraft. 
Some minor drafting changes were proposed by the Governments of 
Belgium, The Netherlands and Yugoslavia. In addition, The Netherlands 
proposed language to harmonize the article with their proposal for a specific 
reference to state-owned vessels in non-commercial service in article 14, and 
Yugoslavia made a similar proposal. The Rapporteur accepted this notion and 
redrafted the article.194 At the meeting of the Intern?-tional Law Commission 
on 9 May 1956 Krylov rejected the new wording, saying that The 
Netherlands' proposal was "quite unrealistic," presumably in light of the 
Soviet position making all government vessels legally identical, whether 
engaged in commercial, military or other service.195 Fitzmaurice noted that 
the problem would be the same whether or not the government vessel taken 
over by mutineers and committing acts of "piracy" were in commercial or 
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non-commercial service prior to the mutiny. He suggested the question "be 
ventilated in the Subcommittee" for drafting, and that suggestion was 
adopted. l96 There are no record~ available of the drafting committee's 
reasoning, but apparently The Netherlands' suggestion supported by 
Fitzmaurice but modified to eliminate the distinction between warships and 
other government vessels, won out. The distinction between a "warship" and 
other government vessel was reinserted at the diplomatic conference in 
Geneva, but with no apparent legal reason, since both military and non-
military government vessels are put in the same category and no distinction 
between military and commercial aircraft was similarly inserted. The final 
version appears as article 16 of the 1958 Convention and article 102 of the 1982 
Convention: 
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 101 [15] [39],197 committed by a warship, 
government ship or [a] government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken control 
of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private [vessel] ship.l98 
Article 16 of the draft was believed to be superfluous by the Government of 
The Netherlands, which argued that if retained it should refer to all acts of 
"piracy," not only those referred to in the first part of the definition. The 
Government of Belgium in its written comments proposed new wording 
whose result was to delete the time limit on the denomination of a vessel or 
aircraft as a "pirate ship or aircraft, " thus subject to search and seizure on the 
high seas. The Belgian suggestion replaced "when it is devoted by the persons 
in dominant control to the purpose of committing" a piratical act, with "ifit 
has committed ... or is intended to be used"by those persons for that purpose. 
The Rapporteur proposed to accept both the Belgian and Netherlands' 
suggestions,l99 and when Mr. A. E. F. Sandstrom (Sweden) pointed out the 
substantive effect of the Belgian proposal, the article was referred to the 
drafting committee.200 The result of the unrecorded deliberations of the 
drafting committee was to adopt the Belgian form but retain the original 
meaning: 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft ifit is intended by the persons in 
dominant control to be used for the purpose of committing one of the acts referred to in 
article 102 [15] [39]. The same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any 
such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons guilty of that act. 
This version appears unaltered as article 17 of the 1958 Convention and article 
103 of the 1982 Convention.201 
Article 17, codifying in part the Peruvian view of the Huascar incident, 
received no comment from governments and was adopted by the Commission 
on 9 May 1956 without further discussion. It appears as article 42 of the 
Commission's final draft with petty drafting changes, and as article 18 of the 
1958 Co~vention and article 104 of the 1982 Convention: 
A ship or aircraft may retain its [national character] nationality although it has become a 
pirate ship or aircraft. The retention or loss of [national character] nationality is 
determined by the law of the State from which [the national character] such nationality 
was [originally] derived.202 
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Article 18 was the article authorizing universal jurisdiction to seize "a 
pirate ship or aircraft" and dispose of the persons and property on board. The 
Government of Belgium made its approval conditional on approval of the 
Belgian revision of article 16. The United Kingdom suggested a minor 
amendment to make clear that capturing states had complete discretion as to 
the legal disposal of the "pirate ship" after seizure. The Rapporteur preferred 
not to raise that issue which he seemed to feel would involve complications.203 
At the meeting of the International Law Commission on 9 May 1956, 
Fitzmaurice repeated the British position, pointing out that there might be 
particular difficulties arising out of the specification in the draft that the 
capturing state could dispose of the seized property while not mentioning the 
"pirate" vessel or aircraft itself. As so interpreted, the British objection 
appeared to be a minor drafting point, and Mr. L. Padilla-Nervo (Mexico) 
suggested it be solved by inserting the words "ships, aircraft or" before the 
word "property" in the part of the article dealing with disposal. The 
amendment was adopted.204 In the drafting committee some further minor 
changes were made, and the final version of the article reported as article 43 
by the Commission, was adopted without amendment by the Geneva 
Conference as article 19 of the 1958 High Seas Convention and now appears as 
article 105 of the 1982 Convention: 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of 
the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and 
may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, 
subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.205 
The difficulties with this language noted above in connection with the 
International Law Commission's first drafting session206 appear to have been 
overlooked, and all the criticisms mentioned there seem still to apply. 
Article 19 specifying the legal result {international liability) for a seizure 
on suspicion of "piracy" without adequate grounds, drew comments from 
The Netherlands and Norway concerning an apparent minor inconsistency in 
language with a non-piracy article (article 21 of the draft) concerning claims 
resulting from any unjustified official boarding on the high seas.207 The 
Rapporteur and the members of the Commission all agreed.208 The minor 
drafting change was referred to the drafting committee. The result was 
article 44 of the Commission's final draft and, without any further 
modification, article 20 of the 1958 Geneva Convention and article 106 of the 
1982 Convention: 
Where the seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been effected without 
adequate grounds, the State making the seizure shall be liable to the State the nationality of 
which is possessed by the ship or aircraft, for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.209 
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The final article dealing directly with "piracy" was article 20, limiting the 
right of seizure to warships and military aircraft. The Government of the 
Union of South Africa in its comment on the draft pointed out that to 
withhold from private vessels the legal right to arrest a "pirate" on the high 
sea would favor "pirate vessels vis-a-vis States with small fleets and a long 
coastline." Nevertheless, South Africa was prepared to accept the draft on 
the grounds that it was "justified by necessity, " presumably meaning that the 
alternative, allowing all vessels to seize suspected "pirates" as Molloy had 
believed was justified by naturallaw,210 would open the way to incidents it 
would be better to avoid; on the basis of an interpretation of another article of 
the draft,211 which seems of doubtful applicability; and on the ground that 
nothing in the draft limits the right of self-defense, under which "the master 
of the vessel against which the act of piracy was committed would 
presumably be entitled to seize the vessel and its crew pending the arrival of a 
warship or military aircraft. "212 The Rapporteur, noting that he agreed with 
this interpretation of the law of self-defense, recommended no change in the 
draft article 20.213 At its meeting on 9 May 1956, M. Georges Scelle (France) 
disagreed that the municipal law concerning self-defense permitted such an 
arrest, implying that the international law of self-defense un amplified could 
go no further, but he concurred in the final position taken by the Rapporteur 
on the ground that he believed the law allowed the functions of public 
authorities to be discharged by others when those authorities were absent.214 
Mr. F. V. Garcia Amador (Cuba), the Chairman of the International Law 
Commission, suggested that some language be added to the Commission's 
commentary on its draft to be forwarded to the U.N. General Assembly to 
make clear that private vessels would be authorized to effect a provisional 
seizure of an attacking "pirate" vessel in the exercise of rights of self-defense, 
but not generally to police the sea. It was agreed that an appropriate 
statement would be put in the commentary, and article 20 was passed without 
change.215 The official commentary was then adjusted by adding the 
following paragraph: 
Clearly this article does not apply in the case of a merchant ship which has repulsed an 
attack by a pirate ship and, in exercising its right of self-defence, overpowers the pirate 
ship and subsequently hands it over to a warship or to the authorities of a coastal State. 
This is not a "seizure" within the meaning of this article.216 
This language presumably the product of the drafting committee, does not 
mention aircraft and seems much more narrow than appropriate to respond to 
the problem raised by the Government of the Union of South Africa. It may be 
supposed that the members of the Commission were simply too tired by this 
time. 
The final version of article 20, numbered article 45 in the Report to the 
General Assembly, is slightly different from the draft that is reported to have 
been approved on 9 May 1956, and it is possible to suppose that the drafting 
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committee had broadly construed its authority again; the changes seem 
nonsubstantive. At the 1958 Geneva Conference a new clause was added at 
the end of that article to take care more directly of the South African point by 
adding other authorized ships or aircraft to the class "warships or military 
aircraft" authorized to seize "pirates." It was adopted as article 21 of the 1958 
Convention (107 of 1982): 
A seizure on account of piracy may only be carried out By warships or military aircraft, 
or other ships or aircraft on government service authorized to that effect.217 
The articles adopted in Geneva in 1958 as set out above were inserted with 
unexplained minor changes in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea concluded at Montego Bay, 10 December 1982218 and appear in that 
Convention as articles 100-107. None of the changes addresses any of the 
substantive points discussed above; only one seems significant. In the last 
quoted article the additional language patched in to the text by the 1958 
Conference was further amended, apparently to narrow the scope for 
possible abuse, as follows: 
A seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by warships or military aircraft, 
or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to that effect. 
The complete text of the 1982 version is reproduced below at Appendix 
III.B. 
"Piracy" Today 
Having decided to reanalyze primary sources in order to discover why it 
seems so difficult to codify a concept as frequently mentioned as "piracy," 
analysis of the secondary sources, the writings of learned publicists, has 
seemed out of place. Indeed, fitted in to historical and jurisprudential context, 
it early became clear that the voluminous writings contributed little to an 
understanding of the behavior of statesmen and courts, but illustrated instead 
the mental agility and theoretical bent of writers who, with varying degrees 
of subtlety, had sharp axes to grind; wanted to make a debating point or fit 
practice into some preconceived pattern oflegal theory rather than examine 
with open eyes the concepts actually motivating statesmen and jurists when 
they used the word "piracy." Indeed, it has never been far from my own mind 
that this work itself, ifit is ever read by anybody, will be sharply criticized for 
what must appear to be departures from orthodoxy to some, and biased 
preconceived argument based on false models of the nature of the 
international legal order by others. My assurances are sure to be dismissed as 
irrelevant or even misleading that I began work with no notion of where it 
would lead, and that my primary sources are quoted at inordinate length to 
make clear the evidence for my rather complex view of the evolution of at 
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least two major streams of meaning and a half-dozen lesser technical 
meanings to the word "pirate" and its derivatives in commonly cited 
literature. 
Nonetheless, I am loath to dissect the most commonly cited secondary and 
tertiary sources. Partly, this is because such a dissection would necessarily 
lead to a wider analysis of the jurisprudential thought of complex minds, like 
that of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, with whom I find myself in profound 
disagreement. I should have thought that such an analysis were better done by 
a disciple than by one whose deepest respect is not uncritical. Nor do I 
imagine that the world will be much improved by a critical study of 
Lauterpacht's thought approached through the narrow path of a study of 
"piracy," which was peripheral to Lauterpacht's own main stream of ideas. 
Thus, Lauterpacht's complex but logical structure built upon the Huascar and 
other cases,219 while defensible, seems shallow; more a manipulation of 
received ideas and immense reading of current literature than an analysis of 
roots, and somehow finds British practice always correct and consistent. But 
consistency among statesmen of different times, with different aims, and 
under different historical and cultural conditions cannot be expected, while 
the research set out in chapters I, II and IV above should respond amply to 
notions that England has been so lucky in its leaders that principled action was 
always taken. 
The deepest commentary on the place of "piracy" in the web of the law is 
probably that of Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, predating the discussions 
of the International Law Commission, but ignored by the Commission.220 
Perhaps it is only because he and I have come to similar conclusions 
independently that his work seems to make such sense, but to those who find 
the current study interesting, Schwarzenberger's analysis should be more so. 
He finds six quite different meanings to the phrase "international criminal 
law": (a) Municipal criminal law applied to persons abroad, mitigated by 
limits in the international legal order on the power to arrest and try the 
accused; (b) international law requiring states to prescribe municipal criminal 
law consequences to various acts, such as treaty or custom forbidding the 
slave trade or exceeding fishery limits; (c) "piracy" jure gentium and war 
crimes, as acts which international law requires states to punish by their 
municipal criminal law in all cases within their enforcement jurisdiction; (d) 
municipal criminal laws common to all states, possibly the residue of Coke's 
natural law theory that would withhold immunities even from foreign 
ambassadors when they commit mala in se;221, 222 (e) matters of customary 
cooperation such as extradition, in all cases based on treaty; and (f) 
international crimes strictly speaking, acts punishable by the international 
community more or less directly such as the "crime" of waging aggressive 
war punished by an international tribunal at Nuremberg. "Piracy," to 
Schwarzenberger, fits only category (c), and if there is a question about the 
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classification, it is only that the authorization international law gives to 
municipal authorities to prescribe and punish "piracy" and "war crimes" is 
not clear as to precisely what "piracy" is. Neither "piracy" nor "war 
crimes" in the normal sense fit category (f), because their definition and 
punishment is left to municipal law entirely; there has never been an 
international tribunal set up to defme and punish "piracy" as such, and the 
novelty of Nuremberg was its new definition of crimes not included in the 
traditional notion of violations of the laws and customs of war; it was because 
of the new crimes and the fact that no national tribunal was competent to 
apply them to German officials except a German tribunal, and none existed in 
Germany with the requisite authority in 1945, that made the Nuremberg 
tribunal necessary and created a new class of international "crimes."223 
With this in mind, it is interesting to ponder for a moment the uses of the 
word "piracy" in recent years. 
The first notorious incident after 1958 in which "piracy" was an issue was 
the seizure of the Portuguese passenger ship Santa Maria by a Portuguese 
political figure, Dr. Enrique Galvao. Portugal appealed for some foreign 
naval help, calling the politically-motivated captors of the vessel "pirates." 
That label, or, at least, its legal results, was uniformly denied by all states 
whose assistance might have been involved. Very little attention was paid to 
the defmition in article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, at 
least in the United States.224 Brazil gave political asylum to Dr. Galvao and his 
band to end the incident; no criminal proceedings followed. 
On 12 May 1975 the American container ship Mayagiiez was captured by 
government forces of Kampuchea off Tang (Wei) a small island whose 
sovereignty was in dispute but which was at the time occupied by 
Kampuchea. President Ford immediately called the capture an "act of 
piracy" and ordered military measures. His use of the word "piracy" was 
reminiscent of the British late nineteenth century practice of using the word 
"piratical" as an adjective to describe foreign government action, then 
turning the adj ective into a noun for the purpose of asserting an enforcement 
jurisdiction in themselves, thus calling foreign military forces "pirates" by 
implication, and themselves policemen enforcing substantive public interna-
tionallaw rather than British Imperial law or British military policy. But the 
American State Department came very quickly to the rescue and on 13 May 
1975 an unnamed "State Department lawyer" was quoted as denying that the 
Kampuchean act was "piracy" in the sense of the 1958 Convention, implying 
as far as a loyal civil servant could that the legal rationale chosen by the Chief 
Executive officer of government was not correct.225 The issue was quickly 
permitted to drop as a military action by the United States was condemned 
widely an excessive, dangerous and unnecessary to procure the release of the 
crew.226 In fact, in tort actions against the vessel's owner before American 
courts in the years that followed, it became clear that the ship had in fact been 
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within three miles ofland legally claimed and in fact occupied by Kampuchea 
at the time of the incident, and that among its cargo were sealed containers 
consigned to the u.s. military.227 It is, of course, possible that Pre.sident Ford's 
use of the word "piracy" reflected a vernacular usage that had never been 
wholly dropped since the 16th century, or a conception of "state piracy" as 
the word was used in Roman times and revived for use against the Barbary 
states from time to time. But the Mayaguez was within any definition of 
Kampuchean territorial waters except one that would deny legal effect to the 
Kampuchean legal claim and physical occupation of Tang Island, and she was 
carrying cargo consigned to the American military in time of military 
activity and great stress in the area, with the United States ranged against the 
revolutionary government of Pol Pot in Kampuchea. It thus seems much more 
likely that President Ford was simply overreacting in words as in military 
deeds, and he used the word "piracy" as a mere pejorative without any 
thought to meaning at all. 
There have been many incidents in the South China Sea and elsewhere of 
what many have called "piracy" since the end of the war in Vietnam on terms 
favorable to the Communist Government there. About a million refugees, 
particularly but not exclusively ethnic Chinese, have left Vietnam, 
Kampuchea and Laos, about half of them by ship, in a flow that reached flood 
proportions in 1978 and 1979. In their struggle to reach haven in Malaysia by 
sea, many were beset by "pirates" based in Thailand, and many others by 
other attackers at sea.228 There are other reported incidents in \Vest African 
waters, Indonesian waters, Philippine waters (particularly among the Muslim 
inhabitants of the southern islands of the Philippines), the Straits of Singapore 
and elsewhere.229 The word "piracy" app.ears frequently in the reports. From 
the point of view of this study, the important point is not the vernacular use of 
the word, or even its occasional use by naval or other governmental personnel 
arguing for international cooperation or even unilateral action to suppress 
this dreadful feature of our time. It is the refusal of states in fact to cooperate 
or even to acknowledge that there is any international obligation to cooperate 
in suppressing the acts called "piracy." Indeed, there has been a notable 
refusal even to discuss the possibility of international cooperation in this 
context. For example, at a Conference on the problems of the Association of 
South East Asian Nations (A SEAN) held at the Fletcher School of Law & 
Diplomacy on 12 November 1981, a very high Malaysian official 
acknowledged that "piracy" existed in the area, but in response to a question 
about whether ASEAN could protect "boat people" on the high seas at least 
from predators putting out from the ASEAN countries themselves or flying 
the flags of ASEAN countries, he replied carefully that American traders 
need not fear "pirates" or lack of police in the "territorial waters" of his 
country, and the Chairman of the session quickly shifted the subject in what 
seemed an attempt to avoid embarrassing the distinguished speaker any further. 
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The Malaysian posltlon requires a deeper analysis. The problem of 
controlling these depredations appears not to be one of definition alone, 
although it might help if either the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 
or the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea had a 
comprehensible definition of "piracy." But discussions do not get even that 
far. The problem instead relates to the strength of the international legal 
order and its emphasis on "standing," the legal link between an act and the 
state within the order trying to apply its view of the law to that act. In theory, 
there is no way to avoid the question of "standing;" all states would deny the 
legal authority of any to govern the acts of foreigners outside the prescribing 
state's territory if the denying state itselfhad "standing" to object, were itself 
affected by the exercise of the prescribing state's jurisdiction. This was 
discussed above230 in connection with the United States Supreme Court 
rejecting universality as the proper extent of American criminal law 
jurisdiction with regard to "piracy." In practice, aside from British actions of 
doubtful legal significance analyzed in such detail above,231 and a handful of 
oft-cited judicial decisions that seem badly reasoned and internally 
inconsistent or inconsistent with known facts,232 the evidence is simply not 
there. The reason is clear. The international law of "standing" reflects 
general theory forbidding intermeddling in the quarrels of others. The 
sovereign equality of states, the lack of a superior to judge the facts, the law or 
the relative importance of conflicting national interests, and the overall 
system's interest in limiting disputes to the narrowest possible compass 
involving the fewest possible people, are summarized in the Latin maxim" res 
inter alios acta [a thing involving (only) others]." Such intermeddling would 
thus be indignantly rejected by the states involved in the absence of 
agreement to arbitration, an agreement establishing some international 
organization's purview, or some other legal basis for the intervention. As a 
matter of customary law and practice, very few states in very few 
circumstances have engaged, or would even have considered engaging, the 
lives of their mariners, the money of their taxpayers, or the prestige of their 
rulers in policing activities with regard to acts that have no clear impact on 
the material interests of influential constituencies. 
British expanding and aggressive mercantile interest, overwhelming naval 
dominance, and self-perception as a law-abiding race bringing justice to 
benighted parts of the globe from the time of the end of the Napoeonic Wars 
to the World War of 1914-1918, brought together a combination of factors 
making universal "standing" under the law, with Great Britain the only 
country likely to be able to exercise it, seem a compelling legal rationale for 
police actions. An added benefit was that those actions so rationalized would 
give the British discretion to keep order or not as the British chose. The 
supposed "obligation" to "cooperate" in suppressing "piracy" implied that 
somebody else was shouldering the primary burden in cases actually far from 
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British trade routes or ambitions; and in cases in which the British wanted to 
be the prime actors, they could call on the help of others under this supposed 
"obligation," amounting to an obligation of others to help support British 
military actions in British interest. To those for whom security of life, 
property and international trade was a higher value than national self-rule 
and the equality of legal persons under the law, the British rationale 
combined morality with interest and must have been very compelling indeed, 
while still not saddling British gove!nments with any obligation to risk blood, 
treasure or prestige on police actions beyond their constituencies' interest. 
But in many parts of the world today, particularly parts that had at one 
time in the not too distant past been parts of the British Empire, the value of 
national self-rule and the equality oflegal persons under the law, i.e., of states 
under international law, now seem higher in cases of conflict than the value of 
life and property, particularly the life and property of foreigners. The 
Malaysian, indeed ASEAN, refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the acts of 
even their own nationals to protect "boat people" in the South China Sea 
area, thus seems to rest on a denial of American and presumably British and 
other third countries' legal basis for complaint; it is a reservation of discretion 
comparable to that of the British during the heyday of Empire, but without 
the world-wide commercial interest and pride that led to British assertions of 
universal jurisdiction when it suited British interest. To make matters worse 
for the victims of "piracy" today, as long as the social, economic and political 
orders of the ASEAN states are not affected by the attacks on the "boat 
people, " the same factors that lead third countries to abstain from action must 
also lead the leaders of the ASEAN nations to abstain from direct action. 
While their own jurisdiction over their own nationals committing these 
depredations on the high seas is not denied, neither is it exercised. Since the 
states which have undeniable "standing," Vietnam and China, apparently 
make no complaints about atrocities committed against those whom the 
international legal order allows them to protect on the high seas, and take no 
police action of their own to raise the issues with the ASEAN countries, the 
ASEAN countries feel neither internal nor external pressures to act 
themselves. 
An added factor in the policy question of whether the United States should 
try to assume the former British position, arguing universality of jurisdiction 
and a right under international law to apply national criminal prescriptions to 
the acts of foreigners against other foreigners on the high seas when no clear 
American legally protected interest is affected, is the basic rule of the 
sovereign equality of states in the international legal order. What the United 
States can legally do, the Soviet Union can legally do; and the Soviet base in 
Cam Ranh Bay is closer to the scene of the action than American bases in the 
Philippines. There seems to be no convincing legal rationale that would 
permit American action and forbid Soviet action in the South China Sea, so 
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the better course might be to forbid the action of both as long as the legally 
protected interests of both are not threatened. Thus, the policy reasons that 
give rise to statements and acts evidencing positive international law dictate 
abstention. 
It can be concluded that "universal jurisdiction" was at best a rule of 
international law only for a limited period of time and under political 
circumstances that no longer apply; at worst it was merely a British 
attribution to the international legal order of substantive rules forbidding 
"piracy" and authorizing all nations to apply their laws against it on the high 
seas, based on a model of imperial Rome, and British racial and commercial 
ambitions that never did reflect deeper realities, as pa!'t of the rationalization 
of imperialism never really persuasive outside of England alone. 
If either view is correct, or any view between th..: two extremes, then even 
Schwarzenberger seems to overstate the role of public international law 
regarding "piracy." The legal order is better reflected by the unsuccessful 
initiative ofPero at a late meeting of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea 
Conference, proposing to delete the words "or in any other place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State" from the two articles in the United Nations draft in 
which they appear, articles 100 and 105.233 It may be remembered that the 
person most forcefully and successfully arguing for the inclusion of those 
words in the International Law Commission's draft had been Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, whose perceptions of the needs of the international legal order 
as they relate to the high seas derived more directly from British experience 
than from the experience of smaller states seeking to establish and maintain 
their own authority and limit legal justifications for the incursions of others. 
It may be no accident that the state making the new proposal was the state 
most aggrieved by the British position in the Huascar incident. From this point 
of view, it is possible to assert with some confidence that there is no 
international law of "piracy" at all, and it is possible that there never has been 
any such law except in the autointerpretive projections of some states from 
time to time seeking either to expand their jurisdiction to safeguard their own 
trade or establish imperial interests, or in the theories of those who prefer to 
call their personal moral insights "law" as if universally applicable and not 
requiring a legislative de'cision by a "legislator" empowered within a legal 
order. 
There are many other reasons in theory for denying the present day 
existence of an international law of "piracy," such as the general 
acknowledgment today that all criminal acts must be so defined by statute 
before they can be punished, nulla crimen sine lege; nulla poena sine lege.234 Thus, 
the very notion of there being an "international crime" in the absence of a 
statute binding on the tribunal before which the accused is brought, is 
inconsistent with basic theory for those accepting the validity of the 
platitudinous rule.235 Indeed, it is possible to argue further that the roots of the 
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confusion lie in the attempt by "natural law" jurists, reversing the original 
meanings of the Latin words, to turn the moral imperatives, the ''jus'' (as in 
''justice''), into legal imperatives, "legis" (as in "legislation"). In the case of 
"piracy," this seems to have been attempted through denominatingjudges as 
legislators for more than the case before them; by construing every precedent 
into a legislative act regardless of political reasons that might dissuade the 
community from accepting that form of legislation; reasons from the 
particular, such as the quality of trial advocacy and the impossibility of 
presenting general, community interests before a court in a single case, to the 
general, resting on the selection process of "judges" and their function under 
the constitution that empowers them to resolve cases. But these questions 
take us far beyond the bounds of a study of the law of "piracy" and into areas 
of jurisprudence better left for another occasion. 
It may be concluded that both in current practice and in current theory 
built upon ancient roots and the evolution of the international political and 
legal orders, there is no public international law defining "piracy;" that the 
only legal definitions of "piracy" exist in municipal law and are applicable 
only in municipal tribunals bound to apply that law; that these examples of 
municipal law do not represent any universal "law of nations" based on moral 
principle and right reason exemplified through identical laws of different 
countries, but rather rest on national policies made law by the constitutional 
processes of the different countries; and that such other uses of the word 
"piracy" as exist in international communication reflect vernacular usages, 
pejoratives, and perhaps memories of Imperial Rome and Imperial Britain 
inconsistent with the current legal order and of doubtful legal effect even 
when used most emphatically in the heyday of both empires. 
It is possible to argue, of course, that regardless of the weakness of the 
precedents taken in full context the conference process both in 1958 and 1982 
produced widely acceptable formulations that must reflect some consensus. 
There might be some substan.ce to this argument as it applies to rules actually 
discussed at the conferences, such as rules relating to passage through 
international straits and innocent passage through territorial waters. But as 
has been shown at great length above, the formulations relating to "piracy" 
reflect no such process ~d no such discussion. And if the 1958 formulation in 
its current version were in fact regarded as codifying acceptable rules 
regarding- "piracy," it should now be apparent that the rules so codified, 
when read carefully, are incomprehensible and therefore codify nothing. 
It is also possible to argue that the persistence over two millenia of some 
concept of "piracy," universal jurisdiction and' a common criminal law 
applicable to persons outside the state system who interrupt commerce, 
creates a presumption that there is some "law" forbidding "piracy" and 
authorizing states to do something about it. But, as has been shown, the basic 
premise is wrong. The "piracy" of ancient Rome was a form of belligerency, 
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not criminal behavior; the "piracy" of Admiralty tribunals reflected 
municipal law and was restricted by underlying rules of the international 
legal order limiting national jurisdiction. The rhetoric seems always 
overdrawn or political; the cases seem narrow and, where used as a vehicle 
for expressing great generalities, a forerunner to political action that in 
practice proved disastrous to those who tried to use their view of the law to 
justify political movement. The actual practice of states, resting on the state 
system as it has existed more or less since the time of Gentili and Grotius, 
evidences unwritten" constitutional" rules in the international order that are 
disregarded only at the cost of futility or failure. 
On the other hand, it is possible that there are small cracks in that order that 
permit something like the concept of "piracy" and universal jurisdiction in 
some very narrow circumstances. For example, where there is a lacuna, a gap, 
in the rules of national jurisdiction so that no state has the legal power to apply 
its law to an incident, the universal interest in international commerce might 
authorize any state to apply its law. But the pattern is not one of overlapping 
jurisdictions then, it is the hunt for "standing," some basis in the legal order 
for action. From this point of view, there is no substantive international law 
defining "piracy" to be enforced by states directly; there is an international 
law distributing the legal power to apply municipal law to the acts of 
foreigners. It would seem that if there is any international law relating to 
"piracy" it is the legal power given to all states to apply their municipal laws 
to foreigners, even acting in foreign vessels or aircraft, in those cases in which 
the acts of those foreigners can be considered to injure the prescribing state 
more or less directly under the general international law restricting 
"standing. " Thus the internationalla~ relating to "piracy" comes down to 
the adoption of principles of "passive personality" to activities in which the 
prescribing state's only connection with the act to which it attaches legal 
consequences is the nationality of the vk:tim or the property affected by the 
act. Since the international law regarding the extent of national jurisdiction 
subordinates passive personality jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on the 
nationality of the actors and the legal subordination of the territory or vehicle 
in which the act occurs, what is left is a small residue oflegal power which, if 
exercised beyond the bounds of legal "standing" to apply national 
prescriptions, embroils the prescribing state in legal complications that easily 
slip into attempts to extend general prescriptive jurisdiction beyond the 
bounds the legal order accepts. That is the path to imperial adventures that 
states embark on at their peril. 
It bears repeating that both words "peril" and "empire" have the same 
Greek root as the word "pirate. " From the point of view of this study, all three 
words have evolved in meaning over time, and "empire" and "pirate" now 
relate more to a disregard of the legal powers of others than to the Greek 
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word relating to experiments and experience. It is the disregard of the legal 
powers of others to determine property and personal rights that is common to 
both "piracy" and "imperialism." The use of the word by Roman and British 
empire-builders to classify the equally disdainful depredations of those whose 
political organizations lay outside the imperial jurisdiction, and then, in the 
latter case, the assumption of an authority to apply English municipal 
criminallaw to those persons called "pirates" without nationality, territorial, 
or passive personality victims as links to the prescriptive order, was the result 
of a logical confusion and in practice ironical. It did not increase respect for 
British ''justice'' or for international law, and embroiled the British in the 
expense and bloodshed of colonial wars while rationalized as a police action 
to enforce the law without recourse to war. It was an assumption of legal 
authority by those whose conception oflaw made it indistinguishable from a 
mere policy to use physical force. From this point of view, the fatal sin of the 
"pirates" and empire-builders was the same. It was not avarice, but 
"hybris"-the overweening pride of Greek myth that leads ultimately to 
destruction via the path of power. 
Notes 
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case R. v. Green analyzed in pertinent part in the text at notes II-87 sq. above; a case notorious for its 
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referral of the "piracy" analogy to legal experts. Root apparently took the position that the word was 
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31. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Tokyo, 14 
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32. rd., arts. 3 and 4. 
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33. This is not the place for a more elaborate re-examination of the public international law regarding 
the legal bases for extending municipal criminal law prescriptive jurisdiction. In The Lotus Case, P.C.!.J. 
Ser. A, No. 10 (1927), Part IV, the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague specifically 
reserved its ~osition, refusing to either accept or reject a French contention that the nationality of the 
victim taken by itself was insufficient as a basis in law for a state to exercise jurisdiction to prescribe over a 
foreign individual acting outside the territory of the prescribing state. As has been amply documented 
above, whatever the limits of this so-called "passive personality" as a basis for asserting jurisdiction to 
prescribe municipal criminal consequences for the acts of a foreigner outside the territorial or Admiralty 
jurisdiction to enforce of the prescribing state, "passive personality," i.e., injury to a national of the 
prescribing state, has been accepted from the earliest days as a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction to 
prescribe with regard to the acts of foreigners on foreign vessels sailing the high seas when two or more 
vessels of different flag or no flag were involved. It is possible to suggest that if "piracy" is a substantive 
"crime" under international law at all, one legal effect is to endow states with jurisdiction to enforce their 
municipal laws relating to it on the basis of "passive personality," i.e., the nationality of the victim. 
\Vhether that extension of jurisdiction on the basis of "passive personality" is better regarded as the 
maximum extension of national jurisdiction, with or without the quite separate jurisdiction asserted over 
stateless "pirates" to fill a jurisdictional gap (see text at notes 11-61 sq., 11-80 sq., III-64 sq. and III-85 sq. 
above), or as merely the only type of "universal jurisdiction" that is undoubtedly exercised by states in 
view of the policy reasons why jurisdiction is declined in other cases involving the acts offoreigners abroad 
(see, e.g., U.S. v. Pedro Gilbert, 2 Sumner 19 (1834), analyzed in text at notes III-69 sq. above; In re Tivnan in 
text at notes III-259 sq. above) seems to depend on whether the analyst takes fundamentally a "naturalist" 
or "positivist" stance as to the basis of the rules relating to "piracy" in public international law. 
-34. The basic articles of the 1963 Tokyo Convention are Article 9.1: 
The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any Contracting State 
in the territory of which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds to 
believe has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft an act contemplated in 
[the Convention]. 
and Article 13.1: 
Any Contracting State shall take delivery of any person whom the aircraft commander 
delivers pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1. 
The custody assumed under this provision is stated in Article 13.2 to last only "for such time as is reasonably 
necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted. " 
35. Id., art. 1.1. 
36. U.S. v. Tully and Dalton, 1 Gallison 247 (1812), discussed immediately after note III-54 above. 
37. U.S. v. Wiltberger,18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 76 (1820), discussed in text at notes III-73 sq. above; U.S. v. 
Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 144 (1820), discussed in text at notes III-81 sq. above. 
38. The release from custody provision is art. 13.2, quoted in part in note 34 above. 
39. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, The Hague, 16 December 1970, 
T.I.A.S. 7192; 22 U.S.T. 1641; 860 U.N.T.S. 105. As of this writing there are well over 100 parties to this 
Convention, including Israel, Uganda, the United States and the USSR,Jordan, Libya, but not Algeria or 
Cuba. 
40. Article 1. 
41. Article 2. 
42. 49 U.S. Code sec. 1472(n)(1), added by P.L. 93-366 ~ec. 103(b) on 5 August 1974, 88 Stat. 410 at 411. 
43. Text at note 40 above. 
44. This is not the place for a deeper analysis of the American legislative process or the technicalities 
surrounding the enactment of this particular Act. 
45. See text at notes 11-91 sq. and IV-292 sq. above for use "licensing" and "recognition" as the basis for 
the accusation of "piracy" at international law. 
46. See text at notes IV-270 sq. above. 
47. None of the states parties has uttered such a reservation. 
48. Op. cit. note 39 above, article 4. 
49. Id., article 7. 
50. See note 13 above. Two other cases, in 1922 and 1934, will be discussed at notes 101 sq. and 107 sq. below. 
51. 49 U.S. Code sec. 1472(n)(3), cited at note 42 above. 
52. The term "special aircraftjurisdiction of the United States" is defined in 49 U.S. Code sec. 1301(34) 
to include only: 
(a) civil aircraft of[i.e., registered in-id., sec. 1301(15)] the United States; .•. 
(c) any other aircraft within the United States; 
(d) any other aircraft outside the United States-
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(i) that has its next scheduled destination or last point of departure in the United States, if that aircraft 
next actually lands in the United States; or 
(ii) having "an offense," as defmed in the Convention ... conunitted aboard, if that aircraft lands in 
the United States with the alleged offender still aboard; and 
(e) other aircraft leased without crew to a lessee who has his principal place of business in the United 
States, or if none, who has his permanent residence in the United States ... 
53. For example, in enforcing American antitrust laws. See United States v. Aluminum Company of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The broad statement on p. 443 by Judge Learned Hand has become the 
stated basis for much later American assertion of prescriptive jurisdiction: 
On the other hand, it is settled law-as [the defendant] itself agrees-that any state may 
impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its 
borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these 
liabilities other states will ordinarily recognize. 
Cf. A.L.I., Restatement, Second, Foreign Relations Law of the United States Sec. 18 (1965); Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States (Revised) Sec. 402 (1980). This is not the place to analyze why many foreign commentators 
find this statement far too broad to be properly called "settled law" except in the narrowest American 
Constitutional law context as law for American courts only, and as law which can be denied legal effect 
abroad without impinging on any American legally protected interest. They wonld presumably argue that 
to the extent other states "ordinarily recognize" the liabilities Hand mentions, it is as a matter of political 
expediency, not oflaw. 
More important for present purposes, Judge Hand's summary of what he regards as settled law is limited 
by his own statement to some vague "effects doctrine;" the conduct of foreigners abroad to be within 
Hand's notion of American prescriptive jurisdiction must have "consequences within" the United States. 
Precisely how severe those consequences must be, and of what kinds, are not specified. From the American 
aircraft hijacking legislation cited at note 42 above and quoted in pertinent part in the text at notes 48, 49 
and 51 above, it can be supposed that the Congress did not think the "chilling effect" on international, 
including American, civil aviation from allowing the United States to be an asylum state for foreign 
hijackers confming their acts to foreign aircraft and climes was enough. 
54. See, for example, House of Lords (U.K.) decision of2 December 1977 in Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation, 17(1) ILM 38 (1978). See also the (U.K.) Protection of Trading 
Interests Act, 1980, reproduced in 21(4) ILM 834 (1982). This again is not the place to attempt even a 
summary listing of the actions of foreign governments to maintain what they regard as their national 
prescriptive jurisdiction against the broader assertions of the United States to make rules for the conduct of 
foreign enterprises outside the United States. 
55. T .I.A.S. 7570; 24 U.S. T. 564. There are 99 listed parties to the Convention as this is written. All but 
five of the parties to the Hague Convention of 1970 are also parties to the Montreal Convention of1971; 
two states are parties to the Montreal Convention and not the Hague Convention. Lillich, Transnational 
Terrorism: Conventions and Commentary (1982) 38. The list of parties is at p. 48-50. 
56. Article 1. 
57. U.S. v. Pliskow, 354 F. Supp. 369 (D.C. Mich. 1973), affd 480 F.2d 927. 
58. 49 U.S. Code sec. 1472 (1)(1). The language in this provision traces back to P.L. 85-726 of1958, 72 
Stat. 784, but reached its present (1986) form through P.L. 93-366 sec. 203 in 1974, which reorganized the 
earlier provisions, restricted their effect by adding the requirement that the weapon is, or would be, 
accessible in flight, and expanded their coverage to include the fmal provision about placing a bomb or 
similar explosive or incendiary device aboard the aircraft. 
59. A useful study of the entire range of international and American aircraft hijacking reactions, 
although taking a view of "piracy" that seems to rest on Wheaton without much concern for the 
differences between Wheaton and other publicists' defmitions of "piracy" and the reasons for those 
differences, is N. Joyner, A Contemporary Concept of Piracy in International Law: The Status of Aerial Hijacking as 
an International Crime (1973). 
60. As to statesmen, see the reported Portuguese appeal in connection with the Santa Maria incident of 
22January 1961. Forman, International Law of Piracy and the Santa Maria Incident, 15(8) TheJAG Journal 
143 (1961). To the extent the Portuguese appeal reflected a considered legal opinion, it appears that no 
other country agreed, including the United States, which refused to treat the incident as one involving any 
criminal activity outside of Portuguese municipal law, and Brazil, which eventually gave haven free of 
criminal charges to the Portuguese political leaders who had participated in the seizure of the vessel. 
As to scholars, aside from Joyner, op. cit. note 59 above, a proposal de lege ferenda apparently supporting a 
world-police role on the 19th century British model for unnamed naval powers today, but shallow in its 
analysis oflaw and skimpy in its history, is B.H. Dubner, The Law of International Sea Piracy (1980). Dubner 
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attributes by mere assertion greater clarity and force to a "natural law" concept of "piracy" than any 
research has ever demonstrated, and concludes: "Obviously, the ultimate goal would be the elimination of 
the competence of municipal law to prescribe and enforce penalties regarding the law of international sea 
piracy (and acts of terrorism)" [sic]. !d., p. 162. Dubner's definition of "sea piracy" seems to derive wholly 
from the Harvard draft of1932, 26 A JIL Spec. Supp. 739 (1932), and works quoted there. !d., p. 45. See text at 
notes 72 sq. below. The approach is legislative despite some attempt to make it appear a modest extension 
of existing law: "The competing claims and interests will be, inter alia, the principle of state sovereignty 
versus the interest of the international community in prev'cnting and controlling sea piracy and terrorism." 
Dubner, op. cit. 161. 
A better researched presentation built on Dubner and proposing further elaboration of the concept of 
"piracy" as it might apply to modern "terrorism" (another undefined term) is J.\V. Boulton, Modern 
International Law of Piracy: Content and Contemporary Relevance, 7(6) International Relations 2493 
(November 1983), supplementing an even more historical article, J. W. Boulton, Maritime Order and the 
Development of the International Law of Piracy ,7(5) International Relations 2335 (May 1983). But the history 
in both seems to be a collection without critical analysis, like that of the Harvard Research, to be discussed 
below, which posits a simple, linear historical and jurisprudential movement, and contains huge gaps. 
Another approach, frankly de lege ferenda and, sadly, quite wrong in its superficial historical analysis in the 
light of the research set forth above, is Rubin, Terrorism and Piracy: A Legal View, 3(1-2) Terrorism: An 
InternationaiJoumal117 (1979). There might be some merit to the draft treaty proposed to replace the 
patently defective articles relating to "piracy" in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, cited note 
28 above, arts. 14-22. See note 189 below. 
Of the many other articles on the subject in recent years, perhaps the best researched, although resting 
largely on secondary sources, but with many references to European precedents and history that for 
reasons of space and organization have been neglected in the current work, is Sundberg, Piracy and 
Terrorism, 20 De Paul L. Rev. 337 (1971), reproduced in part in 1 Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treatise on 
International Criminal Law (1973) 455. Sundberg suggests a revival of the legal label "piracy" and its 
application to unrecognized "belligerents," but through an international criminal court rather than 
through the application of municipal law and "universal" jurisdiction. 
Perhaps the most incisive analytical recent article precedes the current excitement about terrorism. It 
will be discussed at notes 220 sq. below: Schwarzenberger, The Problem of an International Criminal Law, 
3 Current Legal Problems 263 (1950). 
61. 20 AJIL Spec. Supp. 2-3 (1926). 
62. M. Wang was not able to attend the Committee's meeting and the amendments were made in 
Committee by M. Matsuda without his concurrence;. !d. 222 note 2. 
63.!d.228. 
64. !d. 228-229. Leagne of Nations pub. C.196.M.70.1927.V at p. 119. 
65. The replies are set out in their entirety in Leagne of Nations pub. cited note 64 above at pp.136-260. 
66. The Portugnese comment is conveniently reproduced verbatim in the Analysis of Replies submitted 
to the Committee of Experts by M. Matsuda and reprinted in 22 AJIL Spec. Supp. 25 at 29-31 (1928). 
67. See text at notes IV-292 sq. above. 
68. There is no direct evidence for this reconstruction of the logic of the Committee, but that has been 
the universal experience of "codification" committees and my own experience. Cf. H. Lauterpacht, 
Codification and DevelopmentofInternational Law, 49 AJIL 16 (1955). The Committee's probable logic is 
in fact dubious. Codification proposals that are not well-founded in history and theory tend quickly to 
become legislative sessions in which each participant seeks to maximize his benefits in disregard of 
"progressive development." Cf. R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 Hague Recueil25 (1969). 
69. Leagne of Nations Doc. C.254.1927.V, reproduced in 22 AJIL Spec. Supp. 216 at 222 (1928). The 
Conference mentioned by M. Zaleski was held in 1930 at the Hague as the "First Conference for the 
Progressive Codification ofInternational Law. "It was regarded as a failure when it could not produce any 
treaties that states would ratify. See J.L. Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International Law (1958) 341. In fact 
the 1930 Conference produced a Convention on Certain Questions Relations to the Conflict of Nationality 
Laws; a Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality; a Protocol 
relating to a Certain Case of Statelessness; and a Special Protocol concerning Statelessness, all dated 12 
April 1930. It failed to produce agreement on the width of territorial waters. A Second Codification 
Conference was proposed but never held. 
70. League of Nations pub. V.LegaI.1927.V.28; reproduced in 22 AJIL Spec. Supp. 345 at 346 (1928). 
71. League of Nations Official Journal, Spec. Supp. No. 53, Oct. 1927, p. 9; reproduced in 22 AJIL Spec. 
Supp. 231 (1928). 
72. Harvard Research, 26 AJIL Spec. Supp. 5 (giving the background of the Harvard Research effort), 738 
(the list of those concerned with the "Piracy" Report) (1932) (hereafter cited as Harvard Research). With no 
disrespect intended towards the Californians, who included such scholars as Max Radin of Berkeley, of 15 
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namc:d Advisers only three were resident outside of California: Charles E. Martin of the University of 
Washington, \V.E. Masterson of the University ofIdaho, and Harold Sprout of Princeton University. 
73. The Protocol of Signature to the Statue of the Permanent Court of International Justice and other 
relevant documents are conveniently reproduced in Hudson, The World Court, 1922-1929 (rev'd ed. 1929) 
103 sq. The Hague Convention of1907 was Convention I of the Second Codification Conference (the first 
was 1899) that climaxed pre-League of Nations attempts to reduce general international law to treaty texts 
and commitments to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. 1 Bevans 577. The Permanent Court 
of Arbitration and the procedures established under the Convention of1907 are still in effect for the United 
States and 48 other countries. 
74. Harvard Research 749. 
75. U. 752, 754. 
76. See text at notes II-61 to II-69 above. 
77. F. Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature, 3 J. of the Soc. of Compo Leg. (new ser.) 204 (1901). 
78. See, for an ascerbic introduction and criticism of the Platonic view of reality, K. Popper, The Open 
Society and Its Enemies (rev'd ed. 1950) 58-85. 
79. U.S. v. Pedro Gilbert & Others, cited in note 33 and discussed at notes III-69 sq. above. 
80. U.S. v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Fed. Cas. 832, No. 15,551 (D. Mass.) (1822), discussed at note III-117 
above. 
81. Harvard Research 756. 
82. U.760. 
83. U.761. 
84. Stiel, Der Tatbestand der Piraterie nach Geltendem VOlkerrecht ••• (1905). 
85. Stiel cites none of them, merely asserting about "englisch-amerikanischen" approaches: " ... ihm ist die 
Piraterie ein Tatbestand des volkerrechtlichen international Strafrechts." rd., p. 14. 
86. "[D lie Piraterie is ihm ein seepolizeilicher Tatbestand." U. 
87. The translation (mine) is difficult and barely conveys the technical implications of the original 
German: "Piraterie ist ein unpolitisches auf die gewerbstn7Jssige Ausilbung r7zuberischer Gewaltakte gegen prinzipieIl aIle 
Nationen gerichtetes Seeunternehmen." U. 28. 
88. U. 30 note 1: 
Nur ist die alte staatliche autorisierte Piraterie nunmehr verschwunden. Aberwenn noch imJahre 1858 von 
den englischen Behilrden in Singapore zum Tode verurteilte malayische Piraten erklarten, dass sie lediglich 
den Befehlen ihrer Herrschergehorsam gewesen seien und nur getan hatten was in ihren Lande herkommlich 
und erlaubt sei ••• , so besteht kein Unterschiedder Anschauunggegen die des IIlyrierkonigs Agron, tIer 229 
v. Chr. den romischen Gesandten erklarte, nach il/yrischem Rechte sei der Seeraub ein erlaubtes Gewerbe. 
I think I have read every reported case decided in Singapore during the 19th century, and the unattributed 
reference to something in 1858 baffles me. The reference to Roman precedent seems only marginally 
relevant and is wrong. The original source (not cited by Stiel) seems to be Polybius, The Histories (LCL 1954) 
ii, 8. The transaction involved Teuta, Agron's widow (Agrondied in 231 B.C.), and relates to the concept 
of state responsibility for private injury, implying a justification for Roman hegemony in the default of 
Illyria accepting responsibility for controlling Illyrian raiders: 
She [Teuta] had quickly put down the revolt of the Illyrians but was engaged in besieging 
Issa ... when the Roman commissioners arrived by sea .... When they had finished 
speaking, she told them she would see to it that Rome suffered no public wrong at the hands 
ofIllyrians, but that so far as private wrongs were concerned, it was not the custom of the 
Illyrian Kings to prevent their subjects from taking plunder at sea. The younger of the 
Roman ambassadors ••. said, "The Romans have an excellent tradition, which is that the 
state should concern itself with punishing those who commit private wrongs, and helping 
those who suffer them. With the gods' help we shall do our utmost, and that very soon, to 
make you reform the dealings of the Kings of Illyria with their subjects." 
Polybius, The Rise of the Roman Empire (I. Scott-Kilvert transl., F.W. Walbank ed. Penguin Classics 1979), 
118-119. Since Teuta had disclaimed responsibility apparently denying that she had licensed Illyrian 
raiders, and Roman action was threatened against Illyria, not against the raiders, it is hard to see how 
"piracy" in any sense pertinent to Stiel's point was involved. 
89. The Serhassan (Pirates) [1845] 2 W. Rob. 354, 3 BILC 778. See text at notes IV-159 sq. above. 
90. Stiel, op. cit. 80: "Ein Unternehmen, das politische Zwecke verfolgt ••• is nicht Piraterie." As to 
"Raubstaaten," "der politische Zweck fehlt ihnen" (p. 83). 
91. See text at notes IV-292 sq. above. 
92. Stiel, op. cit. 94-96. 
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93. Although not the material set out at note 88 above. 
94. Harvard Research 769-822. 
95. Id. 769. 
96. See note III-ll0 above. 
97. See text at notes IV-292 sq. above. 
98. It remains a question of some academic interest why the British so staunchly maintained their weak 
position on this when, at least in unpublished opinions by their own law officers, they had abandoned that position 
as legally untenable as soon as the question squarely arose in cahnness. See text at notes IV -220 sq. above. 
99. Harvard Research 832. 
100. See note 13 above; the first was R. v. Green cited there, and the second is discussed and cited at note 
107 below. 
101. In re Piracy jure gentium [1934] A.C. 586; 3 BILC 836. 
102. Coke, see text at notes 1-197,1-200 sq. above; Molloy and Jenkins, see text at notes II-61 sq. above; 
Hedges, see text at note Il-60 above. All the quotations and analyses above are far more detailed than the 
selective and unanalyzed references and quotations retailed in the case report itself. 
103. The sole citation in the case is to the Parliamentary Paper, Peru No. 1 1877, presumably 
Parliamentary Papers 1877 LXXXVIII 613, Peru No.1 (C. 1833) discussed in text at notes IV -292 sq. above 
and cited at note IV -293. 
104. Discussed in text at notes III-285 sq. and IV-156 sq. above. 
105. Op. cit. note 101 above 599 (842). 
106. Id. 600 (843). 
107. People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, 43 Philippine Islands 19 as reported in 1 Annual Digest of Public International 
Law Cases (1919-1922)(Williams and Lauterpacht, eds. 1932) 164-165, Case No. 112. 
108. Wiltberger, cited note 37 above. See text at notes III-72 sq. above. 
109.2 Hackworth, Digest of International Law (1941) 681-695 (sec. 203). 
110. For example, a statement that u.S. v. Smith is the leading American case supporting the notion that 
there is such a thing as an international law of "piracy" and that it is properly incorporated into American 
law by mere reference in the Act of1819 (see text at notes III-91 sq. above) is immediately followed by a 
long excerpt from Lenoir, Piracy Cases in the Supreme Court, 25]. Crim. L. and Criminology 532 (1934-35), 
including the passage: "It is doubtful whether the Court would hold this view today, nor is it considered a 
correct statement of the present international law on piracy," reasoning that Justice Livingston's dissent 
was more persuasive than the majority opinion and that in near universal practice "piracy" was not only 
punished, but, for sound jurisprudential reasons, defmed only by municipal law. Id. 552-553. 
111. Hackworth, op. cit. 686, 687. 
112. A review of the procedure seems unnecessary here. See Briggs, The International Law Commission 
(1965) 298-30t. 
113. 2 YBILC. 6th Session, 19547. The Report is denominated Doc. A/CN.4179 in the United Nations 
archives. 
114. Op. cit. note 113 above at p. 15. The French text is not directly identified as a mere translation in the 
Report, but in the discussion at the International Law Commission's 290th meeting on 12 May 1955, the 
English text is set out. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195539 note 3. It is verbatim the text of the Harvard article 
quoted above except for changing the word "a" to "the" in the phrase "for private ends without a [the] 
bona fide purpose of asserting a claim of right." Oddly, in the unannotated text of the Harvard Research 
draft Convention, reproduced at Appendix IILA below, the text of art. three differs from the annotated 
text set out above with a third variation on that sentence; the unannotated text has neither "a" nor "the," 
but says merely "private ends without bona fide purpose." The confusion seems inconsequential. 
115. The English version ofM. Franc;ois's draft, identical to the corresponding articles of the Harvard 
Research draft except for stylistic changes, is set out in 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195531 at 51 note t. 
116. Op. cit. note 113 above 46. 
117. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195531 at 36. No precedents or legal argument appear to have been presented 
in support of this amendment proposed by Mr. Jaroslav Zourek (Czechoslovakia - but all members of the 
International Law Commission serve in their private capacities, not as representatives of states); indeed, 
the suggestion seems to have been passed without any substantive discussion at all, 8-0 with 2 abstentions. 
118. See notes 1-126 and 1-127 above. 
119. Document A/CN.4/L.53 paras. 9, 11 and 17, in 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 19551 and 2. 
120. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195539. It should be repeated here that membership in the International Law 
Commission is formally not by country but by individual merit. There is ample evidence in this colloquy 
that the members of the various nationalities in some cases shared the views of their respective 
governments as to the proper legal classifications to be attached to events. This is not improper; indeed, it 
would be odd if it were not so, considering that individual eminence in law is in fact achieved by success 
within a national legal and educational system in nearly all cases, and thinkers of too much originality are 
unlikely to be selected for prestigious public positions by the representatives of states. 
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121. I am indebted to LCDRJohn Petrie, USN, for bringing this incident to my attention and providing 
me with the handy summary of the United Nations procedures and the politics involved in Jessup, 
Parliamentary Diplomacy, 89 Hague Recueil185 (1956) at 189-201. The legal situation was remiliiscent of the 
American Civil War situation with the exception that the Chinese Civil War, ifit can be called that, 
created an occasion for constructing a legal model based on labels that departed so far from reality that it is 
possible to doubt the sanity of those involved. The Republic of China, continuing to regard the Communist 
forces as bandits, exercised the legal powers of visit and search at sea that normally flow only to 
belligerents seeking to interdict contraband. The "neutral" countries were in the same position as the 
United Kingdom protesting the equivalent acts of the Federal Government of the United States in 1861 on 
the ground that without a state of war there could be no status of "neutrality" and no "belligerent rights" 
in the defending government's forces. To call the defending government's forces "pirates," however, 
implies not merely that they had breached international law rules regarding peaceful commerce, but that 
they had no legal privileges at all. That seems to imply that the Communist government in Beijing was the 
sole government in China and that the Republic of China government in Taiwan was an unrecognized 
group of rebels or, worse yet, "bandits" violating the law of China and international law. This is not the 
place to point out all the ironies and distortions involved on all sides, or to trace their roots in British 
Imperial practice and the contradictory positions taken by the Federal Government of the United States 
during our Civil War. 
122. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195541. 
123. Id.43. 
124. See text at and following note 17 above. 
125. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195543. M. Zourek seems to have misread the Nyon Agreement. 
126. It!. 44-45. 
127. Id. 53. 
128. Article 4 of the Harvard draft set out above and in Appendix lILA defmes "pirate ship" to include a 
ship devoted by its company "to the purpose of committing any similar act within the territory of a state by 
descent from the high sea. " This provision was repeated in the first Fran~ois draft. 
129. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195553. 
130. It!. 
131. It!. The proposal had come from Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (United Kingdom). 
132. Id. 54. 
133. Id. 53. 
134. No reference was made to the historical background or jurisprudential basis for this position. The 
evolution of the idea in English law began in 1680, as far as available records indicate. See text at and after 
note II-45 above. The Kwok-A-Sing case analyzed at notes IV-211 sq. above seems to hold directly the 
opposite of Fitzmaurice's views, but was not mentioned. 
135. 1 YBILC. 7th Session, 195554. 
136. In English, the word" essentially" in this sort of context does not necessarily relate to essences in a 
philosophical sense, but can relate to normal conditions. There is little logic to the English language. 
137. 1 YBILC, 7th Session, 195555. 
138. Id. 55-57. 
139. U.N. Doc. Al2934, in 2 YBILC, 7th Session, 195519. The "Piracy" articles are articles 13-20 at pp. 25-26. 
140. Two single-sentence paragraphs follow, identical except for minor polishing with paragraphs 2 and 
3 of the Harvard Researchers' draft article 3. See Appendix lILA. With additional minor alterations in the 
drafting committee, thus with no known discussion of any possible intention to change substance, those 
two paragraphs form the text of paragraphs 2 and 3 of article 15 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
High Seas cited at note 28 above, and paragraphs (b) and ( c) of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, 
Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, article 102. See below and text reproduced at Appendix III.B. 
141. See note II-49 above. 
142. In U.S. v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 Howard) 209 (1844), 1 Deak 56. Hatred and revenge are 
specifically mentioned as "piratical" motives in the text of Story's opinion quoted at note III-218 above. 
143. See text at note 17 above. It is not clear why the International Law Commission referred to the 
treaty as an "Arrangement." 
144. Op. cit. note 139 at p. 25. 
145. On the use of unrestricted submarine warfare during the Second World War, and the ignoring of 
the legal restrictions by both allied and German Admirals, see W.T. Mallison, Jr. , Submarines in General anJ 
Limited Wars, (NWC Blue Book 1966, Vol. LVIII) (1968), esp. p. 47-51 and 192-195 (Interrogation of Fleet 
Admiral Chester \V. Nimitz in connection with the prosecution of German Grand Admiral Doenitz at 
Nuremberg, 1946, reprinted from 40 International Military Tribunal [Nuremberg] 109-111). 
146. See e.g., Dissenting Opinion by Commissioner F.K. Nielsen in International Fisheries Co. Case 
(1931) (U.S. v. Mexico) 4 U.N. R.I.A.A. 691 at 703 sq.; Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter 
Arbitration, 53 Oregon Law Review 259 (1971). 
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147. Op. cit. note 139 above 25. 
148. Cited at note 89 above, discussed in text at notes IV-159 sq. above. 
149. Cited at note 107 above. 
150. Op. cit. note 139 above 25. 
151. Id. 
152. U.S. v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheaton) 144 (1820),8 Deak 20. See Marshall's language, his furthest 
concession to the naturalist views of his friend and colleague, Story, in the text at note 111-82 above. 
153. See text at notes IV-292 sq. above. 
154. Op. cit. note 139 above 26. 
155. See text at notes 111-230 sq. and IV-156 sq. above. 
156. Op. cit. note 139 above 26. 
157. For a brief analysis of the origins in English law of the use of the term "piracy" to justify changes in 
the title to property, see above ch. I passim, esp. text at notes 1-153 and 173 sq. For a scholarly tracing of the 
use of the word "piracy" in English property law, see Wortley Pirata Non Mutat Dominium, 24 BYIL (1948) 
258 at 260-272. Wortley does not address the jurisdictional questions, assuming in rem jurisdiction in an 
English Admiralty tribunal, and apparently assuming that the English cases either reflect universal law , in 
the Blackstone-naturalist tradition, or that it is irrelevant to English decisions what the law might be in 
other countries. Like the other secondary studies cited in this work, Wortley's asserts defInitions of 
"piracy" that seem inconsistent with a deeper analysis of the international usages, practice and writings 
other than his own. 
158. See text at notes 116-117 above. 
159. See text at notes 81-82 above. 
160. Cited at note 13 above. See generally text at notes 11-85 sq. above. 
161. Op. cit. note 139 above 26. 
162. See text at note 11-68. As to police and coast guard or equivalent vessels, the Commission eventually 
decided to solve the apparent inconsistency of authorizing warships to "police" the seas against "pirates" 
while not authorizing "police" vessels of a state to do the same, by making "police" vessels into 
"warships" for purpose of exercising public authority on the high sea. This was done in art. eight of the 
draft and involved discussion not pertinent to "piracy" as such. It is mentioned again in connection with the 
discussion of art. 20 at note 211 below. 
163. Op. cit. note 139 above 26. The other two categories involve suspicion of violating treaties 
abolishing the slave trade, and suspicion that the vessel visited is actually of the nationality of the visiting 
warship although flying (falsely) other colors. They seem irrelevant to this study. 
164. UN Doc. A/CN.4/97 reprinted with corrections in 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 19561. 
165. Id. 37 sq., UN Doc. AlCNAI99 and its addenda. 
166. Id. 13 sq., UN Doc. AlCNAI971 Add. 1, 1 May 1956. 
167. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195645, 343rd Meeting. 
168. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195618, 64. 
169. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195646. 
170. Id. 
171. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, UN Doc. A/3159, in 2 
YBILC, 8th Session, 1956253. The article appears as article 38 of the draft. The 1958 Geneva Convention is 
cited at note 28 above. It entered into force for the United States on 30 September 1962. As this is written it 
has 46 parties. 
172. Cited at note 140 above and reproduced in pertinent part at Appendix III.B below. 
173. The provisions are articles 5(8) and 333(1) and (2), for which a translation supplied by the Legal 
Department of the Shanghai Municipal Council had been published in China in 1935. They are reprinted in 
2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195644: 
Article 5. This Code shall apply to anyone of the following offences committed beyond the 
territorial limits of the Republic of China ... : 
8. Offences of piracy, as specified in articles 333 and 334. 
Article 333. Whoever navigates any vessel not being commissioned by a belligerent State or 
not being part of the naval forces of any State, with intent to commit violence or employ 
threats against any other vessel or against any person or thing on board such other vessel, is 
said to commit piracy, and shall be punished with death, or imprisonment ... for not less 
than 7 years. 
Whoever being a ship's officer [ftn. 'A member of the crew' and 'another member of the 
crew' would be closer to the meaning of the original expressions-iJ.] or a passenger on 
board a ship, with intent to plunder or rob, commits violence or employs threats against any 
other officer [ftn. iJ.] or passenger and navigates or takes command of the ship shall be 
deemed to have committed piracy .... 
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Article 334 does not seem to have been reprinted. These provisions seem to be identical in intention, 
although not in translated English, to articles 1(14) and 352 of the Chinese Criminal Code ofl0 March 1928 
set out in Professor Stanley Morrison's compilation of national laws referring to "piracy" in the Harvard 
Research, 26 AJIL Spec. Supp. 887 (1932) at 952-954. 
174. See text at notes III-64 sq., III-85 sq. and III-l22 sq. above. 
175. Presumably Higgins, The International Law of the Sea (Colombos, ed.) (3rd ed. 1954). 
176. Presumably Ortolan, Kegles Internationales et Diplomatie de la Mer (2 vols.) (3rd ed. 1856). 
177. Presumably 1 Oppenheim, International Law (Lauterpacht ed.) (8th ed. 1954). 
178. Presumably Gidel, Le Droit International Public de la Mer (3 vols.; only vol. 1 refers to the law of the 
high sea) (1932). 
179. Cited note 13 above. See text at notes IV-211 sq. above. 
180. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195664. 
181. U.28. 
182. U. 79. 
183. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195646-47. 
184. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195664. 
185. This seems to be a reverse formulation of the well-established exclusion from the benefits of the 
1944 International Civil Aviation Convention of aircraft "used in military, customs and police services. " 
15 U.N.T.S. 295, T.I.A.S. 1591,3 Bevans 944, article 3. 
186. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195619. 
187. See discussions following note 120 and preceding note 138 above. 
188. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195647. 
189. This is the proposal made on more but still inadequate, data in Rubin, op cit. note 60 above. A more 
or less thorough acquaintance with British 19th century practice in Malayan waters, coupled with a 
superficial knowledge of the jurisprudential issues and the leading cases and writings, lay in the background 
of a proposal to respond to increasing "terrorism" by application of the British Imperial law of "piracy. "I 
propounded a complete treaty text. .,. 
Zourek repeated his objection to the approach taken by the Commission again at the Commission's final 
public review of the draft, its 376th meeting on 27 June 1956, reported in 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 1956265, but 
again gave no reasons to add to his known policy preferences. A deeper awareness of the lex lata might have 
helped us both. 
\Vorks by Dubner and Boulton cited note 60 above have similar arguments based almost wholly on 
natural law speculation and unanalyzed precedents. 
190. Cited respectively at notes 28 and 140 above. 
191. This and other difficulties surely not intended by the drafters are pointed out in Rubin, Is Piracy 
Illegal?, 70(1) AJIL 92 (1976). 
192. This anomaly was raised at the Geneva Conference in 1958 by the delegate of Greece, but the 
proposal to delete the word "illegal" was defeated, 4 votes in favor, 30 opposed, with 16 abstentions. UN 
Doc. A/CONF. 13/40 at 84. There was no reported discussion of the merits. 
193. The British proposal was defeated by 13 for, 22 against, with 7 abstentions. The British argument 
rested primarily on the decision in In re Piracy jure gentium cited at note 101 above. 
194. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195619,38,65,97. 
195. Of course, the Soviet position on this is not only shared by other countries with similar ties between 
government and economic enterprise, but were strongly asserted by the English themselves at one time. 
See text at and following note 11-78 above. 
196.1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195648. 
197. The numbering was changed twice. 
198. 1958 and 1982 Conventions are cited notes 28 and 140 above. 
199. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195619,39,65. 
200. U. 48. The anomaly of referring substantive questions to a drafting committee needs no further 
comment here. Some further drafting changes to this article were urged by A.E.F. Sandstrom (Sweden) at 
the Commission's 376th meeting on 27 June 1956, but relegated at that time to elaboration in the official 
"comment" to accompany the text. U. 265. 
201.1958 and 1982 Conventions cited notes 28 and 140 above. 
202. U. 
203. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195619,39,81. 
204. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195648. 
205.1958 and 1982 Conventions cited notes 28 and 140 above. 
206. See text following note 156 above. 
207. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195665,67. Article 21 included suspicion of "piracy" along with "slave trade" 
and suspicion that the vessel is actually of the same nationality as the interfering warship although flying a 
foreign flag or no flag, as grounds for boarding. The Netherlands and Norwegian governments were 
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obviously correct in seeing an overlap between that article and article 19 of the draft, and in trying to 
minimize the confusions that would arise from inconsistencies in language. 
208. 1 YBILC, 8th Session 195648. 
209. 1958 and 1982 Conventions cited notes 28 and 140 above. 
210. See text at note II-68 above. 
211. Article 8, which assimilated all state vessels to warships for the purpose of exercising public 
authority on the high sea. The evolution of art. eight seems to be beyond the scope of this study. 
212. 2 YBILC, 8th Session, 195679. 
213. Id. 20. 
214. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195648. The legal position taken by M. Scelle seems sound in rejecting an 
expansion of the normal tight restrictions of international law on the authority of a state acting in 
self-defense. His notion that a third person should be regarded as legally empowered to act for public 
authority in cases of default seems overstated, but consistent with a line of precedent and argument 
adverted to at note IV-222 above. The international law regarding self-defense is very narrowly defined. 
See Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (1958) for a start on the tremendous volume oflearned writing 
in this area. 
215. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 195648. 
216.2 YBILC, 8th Session, 1956283. This language was to some degree adjusted to make clear that a 
merchant ship need not have had it in mind to hand a "pirate ship" over to proper authorities in order to 
exercise its own rights of self-defense. The point was raised by Fitzmaurice at the 376th Meeting and the 
suggestion of an amendment to the official comment on the article was there approved, the text to be 
drafted later. 1 YBILC, 8th Session, 1956166. 
217. 1958 Convention cited note 28 above. 
218. 1982 Convention cited note 140 above. 
219. Compare text at notes IV -292 sq. above with 1 Oppenheim, International Law (Lauterpacht, ed.) (8th 
ed. 1955) 608-617 (secs. 272-280). 
220. Schwarzenberger, op. cit. note 60 above. 
221. See Palachie' s Case, 1 Rolle 175 (1615), reproduced in pertinent part at note 1-197 above, holding a 
taking under a foreigu king's commission not to be malum in se and thus upholding the Moroccan 
Ambassador's immunities in an English court. This rule is set out in Coke's usual direct simplicity in Coke, 
Fourth Institute of the Laws of England (1644) 153: 
But if a foreign Ambassador being Prorex commiteth here any crime which is contra jus 
gentium [i.e., against the reason-based law common to all nations], as Treason, Felony, 
Adultery, or any other crime which is against the Law of Nations, he loseth the privilege 
and dignity of an Ambassador, as unworthy of so high a place, and may be punished here as 
any other private Alien, and not to be remanded to his Sovereign but [as a matter] of 
curtesie. 
222. Coke's views on this were interpreted to the reverse conclusion by 1710. See statute 7 Anne c. 12 
(1708) and the argument based on Coke's writings by Attorney General Sir James Montague in the Case of 
Andrew ArtemonowitzMattueoff. AmbassadorofMuscovy, Q.B., 8 Queen Anne (1710),10 Mod. 4, reproduced in 
Scott, Cases on International Law (1922) 286. 
223. I trust that Professor Schwarzenberger will forgive the misstatement that inevitably flows from an 
attempt to digest somebody else's thought. The interested reader is encouraged to view the original for 
himself. 
224. I was the action officer within the Office of the AssistantGeneral Counsel (International Affairs) in 
the Department of Defense at the time. The legal position that guided the Defense Department's reaction 
to the Santa Maria incident was an early version of the analysis set out in Forman, op. cit. note 60 above. 
225. New York Times, 13 May 1975, p. 1 col. 8 (President Ford "considers this seizure an act of piracy"); p. 
19, col. 7, (unnamed State Department lawyer). 
226. !d., 15 May 1975, p. 1., col. 5-6 (Thailand protests American troop movements related to the 
Mayagilez incident). 
227. 6 International Practitioner's Notebook 3 (April 1979). 
228. The facts have appeared in many newspaper stories from 1975 to the present. A useful retelling 
based on those reports is "Age," The Boat People (Bruce Grant, ed.) (Penguin Books 1979). Many stories are 
told orally by American naval personnel who witnessed atrocities in the area, and by refugees and relief 
workers with experience in Malaysian and Thai refugee camps. 
229. For example, off the West coast of Africa. See 61 African Business 77 (September 1983). And, on the 
commercial importance of the problem and the inadequacy of current legal approaches, see UNCTAD 
Doc. TD (B) C.4/ ACAI2 of21 September 1983, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, Review andAnal}.sis 
of Possible Measures to Minimize the Occurrence of Maritime Fraud and Piracy, p. 12, 63-66. I am indebted to 
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Professor Martin Glassner of Southern Connecticut State College for bringing these items to my attention. 
Mr. Lawrence \V. \Vhite has kindly sent me a copy of an article asserting with some likelihood of accuracy 
that the "piracy" in the southern Philippines is at least in part politically motivated, and that local 
authorities might be more upset at the use offirearms by foreign yachtsmen defending themselves than by 
the "pirates." Scott, Pirate Attack in Paradise, Yachting (May 1984) 25 at 28, and see the Note, Some 
Afterthoughts on Piracy, id., at 31. 
230. Ch. text at notes III-64 sq., III-85 sq. and III-122 sq. above. 
231. See text at notes IV-230 sq. above. 
232. Like The Serhassan (Pirates), cited at note 89 above, and People v. Lol-Lo and Saraw, cited at note 107 
above. 
233. See Appendix III.B below. The articles are set out above at notes 171 and 205 in their earlier 
incarnation as articles 14 and 19 of the 1958 Convention. The Peruvian proposal is reported in UNCLOS III 
Doc. C.21Informal Meeting/64/Rev. 1 dated 13 August 1980.1 am deeply indebted to Professor Martin 
Glassner of Southern Connecticut State College for bringing this document to my attention and making it 
available to me. 
234. Literally, no crime exists without a statute creating it; no punishment can be imposed without a 
statute authorizing it. This modem translation equating "lege" to "statute" is not quite right, since the 
word "lege" (and "lex") were used by Cicero to include the natural or moral "vera lex [true law]" 
discoverable by "recta ratio [right reason]" and supreme even when inconsistent with positive law adopted 
by the senate or the people of Rome: "Huie legi nee obrogari fas est neque potest, nec vero aut per senatum aut per 
populum solvi hac lege possumus [\Ve cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people]. "Cicero, De Re 
Publica III, xxii. On the other hand, the Fetiallaw under which war could be declared and which according 
to Livy was adopted as a matter of policy choice by the early King Ancus from the Aequicolae, was called 
by both Cicero and Livy ''fetiali ••• iure." Cicero, De Officiis I, xi, 36 quoted in note 1-46 above. But this is not 
the place to attempt even a summary of the very complex Roman distinction between "lex" and "jus," and 
the even more complex relationships between natural law, moral law, divine law and positive law 
purportedly resting on Greek and Roman writings and argued with vigor and inconsistency by 2500 years 
of jurists (and legists). 
The English word "law" is not now generally believed to be cognate with the Latin "lex," although 
such words as "legislation" were imported into English later and are clearly Latin-rooted (from "legis," the 
nominative plural of "lex"). The American Heritage Dictionary traces the English words "law" and 
"legislate" to different Indogermanic roots, leg- and legh- (American Heritage Dictionary, p.1525), meaning to 
collect and to lay flat respectively. But, as the editors of the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) point out, "As 
law is the usual English rendering ofL[atin] lex, and to some extent ofL[atin]jus ... , its development of 
senses has been in some degree affected by the uses of these words." OED, Vol. "L" p. 113. A multivolume 
analysis would be necessary if the word "law" in English were to be given the same sort of etymological 
and jurisprudential investigation that 1 have attempted to give to the word "piracy" here. 
235. For a modem example, see the attempts to create an international criminal law and an international 
criminal court by various lobbies within the United Nations, incisively analyzed in Gross, Some 
Observations on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 13 Israel Yearbook 
on Human Rights 9 (1983). 
